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Do labour taxes (and their composition) affect 
wages in the short and the long run? 
by 
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Measures aimed at reducing the tax burden on labour have been advocated to 
alleviate the EU unemployment problem. Most of the analyses document a 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the tax burden on labour. Hence, it 
is not possible to discern whether the effect on unemployment derives from labour 
demand, labour supply or through the wage formation mechanism. Moreover, the 
empirical analyses are usually static, and may be indicative of the steady-state 
determinants of the unemployment rate and do not reveal the features of the 
adjustment process. This paper studies the relationship between labour taxes and 
labour costs by modelling the wage formation mechanism in a dynamic context. We 
test if the composition of labour taxes affects labour costs in the short- and in the 
long-run and whether highly centralised bargaining systems have better 
employment performance than decentralised ones. We apply static and dynamic 
panel data techniques to a panel of EU countries. Our findings suggest that there is 
probably some wage resistance in the short-term but not in the long-term, although 
the transition to the long-term can be very long and therefore the short-term impact 
and the dynamics of adjustment can be long-lasting.  
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I.  Introduction  
  
The increase in the tax burden on labour in the 1980s and 1990s has often been 
advocated as one of the main causes of the rising and persistent EU 
unemployment rate. To alleviate the European unemployment problem, some 
EU countries have started implementing measures aimed at reducing the tax 
burden on labour.  
 
Despite the broad concerns on the effect of taxes on labour market 
performance, the empirical findings are somewhat ambiguous1. Most of the 
analyses document a relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
(average) tax burden on labour. Hence, it is not possible to discern whether 
and to what extent taxes affect the unemployment rate because of a labour 
demand effect, i.e. through the impact of taxes on the labour cost at an 
unchanged wage rate, or because of a labour supply effect, i.e. operating 
through the incentives and disincentives to take-up a job (as generated by the 
interaction between tax and benefit systems) or through the wage formation 
mechanism. Furthermore, apart from a few recent exceptions, the empirical 
analyses are static, and thus indicative of (at most) steady-state determinants 
of the unemployment rate.  Static methods do not reveal the features of the 
adjustment process, and consequently, the time needed to achieve a desired 
change in the variable of interest.  
 
This paper explores the empirical relationship between taxes on labour and 
labour costs by modelling the wage formation mechanism in a dynamic 
context. In competitive markets the quantity traded in the market is 
independent of the side of the market which is taxed. In contrast, in imperfect 
competitive markets, the composition of the tax burden on labour may not be 
irrelevant. A shift of social security contributions from employers to 
employees which leaves the average tax wedge unaffected may still affect the 
after-tax wage. A similar argument holds for a shift from social security 
contributions to income taxes. We verify if the distribution of the tax burden 
between workers and employers affects the wage formation mechanism, both 
in the short and in the long-run. Finally, we test the hypothesis that the effects 
on real labour costs of changes in the tax burden and/or in its distribution 
between workers and employers are mediated by the extent of centralisation 
and coordination of wage bargaining. We test whether centralisation and 
coordination are associated with wage moderation.  
 
The contribution of this paper to the existing empirical literature is threefold. 
First, we base the analysis on a measure of the tax wedge and of its 
components calculated by the OECD on the basis of micro-simulation of 
                                                 
1 See OECD (1994) and Nickell and Layard (1999).  
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national tax legislation. Combining information on tax schedules and tax 
codes with data on income distribution overcomes the limits of the alternative 
approach used in the literature to calculate tax indicators (the so-called 
Mendoza-Razin–Tesar approach2). By relating the effective tax revenues 
directly to the relevant macroeconomic variables in national accounts the 
Mendoza approach has the limit that the implicit tax rates are endogenous. 
Second, we explore the effect on the labour costs of the different components 
of the tax wedge, while most of the analyses focus on the overall tax wedge 
(i.e. assume the invariance of the composition). Third, we check the 
robustness of our findings against alternative estimation methods.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews 
the main issues related to the impact of labour taxation on real labour costs 
and employment. Section 3 presents some empirical findings along with 
descriptive statistics on the structure and the dynamics of tax wedge across 
countries. Section 4 presents the econometric results. First, we explore the 
relationship between the tax burden on labour and the before-tax wage. 
Second, we evaluate if the effect of taxes on labour costs differs according to 
the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining. Third, we test whether the 
composition of taxes on labour matters. Section 5 concludes.  
II. Taxation, labour cost and unemployment 
 
There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of 
labour taxation on both wage and employment. While the statutory incidence 
of a tax may be relevant for political reasons3, it is well known from the tax 
theory that the nominal statutory incidence is irrelevant in determining the 
economic incidence of a tax. To the extent that the price of the item taxed 
changes when a tax is levied, the tax is shifted and the final incidence can be 
on a base that is completely different from that implied by the statutory 
nominal incidence. Hence, the actual burden of the tax depends on a set of 
complicated behavioural responses and generally falls on the side of the 
market (demand or supply or real wage bargaining curve, in imperfect 
competitive markets) that is most inelastic. The final incidence of the tax is 
determined not only by the elasticities of labour demand and labour supply 
to, respectively, labour costs and the after tax wage but also by the nature of 
wage negotiations and by the interactions of tax with other institutions (e.g. 
the fiscal treatment of unemployment benefits and the extent of coordination 
of bargaining).  
 
From the demand side, when increases of taxes on labour income (personal 
income tax and social security contributions-hereafter SSCs) raises labour 
costs, the labour demand shifts downward. In the case of the right to manage 
                                                 
2 See Mendoza et al. (1994). 
3 Although this can be the result of “fiscal illusion”, voters do not seem indifferent between a statutory 
tax rate of 10% or 30% even if the final incidence would be the same.   
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bargaining model, the wage-setting curve is negatively sloped and an increase 
in SSCs always raises unemployment, the more so when the unemployment 
benefits (UBs) are not indexed or not taxed at the same rate as wage income.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the size of the impact of tax cuts on wages 
and unemployment is crucially related to the fiscal treatment of 
unemployment benefit (Pissarides (1998), Van Der Ploeg (2003)). What is 
relevant is whether UBs are taxed or not4 or, more generally, whether it is the 
net replacement rate (the ratio of unemployment benefit to net wages) rather 
than the level of unemployment benefits that is fixed. The effects of tax cuts 
on wage and unemployment under these two different UB schemes and for 
four labour market models (competitive, union bargaining, search and 
efficiency models) were modelled and simulated by Pissarides (1998). The 
four models have the same implication in terms of the interaction of tax cuts 
and unemployment benefits: a scheme in which UBs are taxed (or, 
equivalently the net replacement rate is fixed) makes the supply/wage-setting 
curve less elastic (steeper) than the case of non-taxed UB.   
 
This can be seen in Figure 1 which provides a simple diagrammatic 
illustration of the labour market outcomes following a tax cut, under the two 
conditions of unemployment benefits taxed and not taxed. We have 
represented the impact on real wage and on employment when the 
downward-sloping price setting relationship (or labour demand curve- Ld)5 
shifts upwards, following a cut in the tax rate. The vertical axis measures the 
after-tax wage level while the horizontal axis measures the level of 
employment. There are two upward-sloping wage-setting curves (or labour 
supply curve WS)6 with two different slopes, related to the two UB schemes 
(taxed-non taxed).  Because of the lower elasticity of the wage-setting curve 
under the condition of taxed UB (or fixed NRR), tax cuts will more likely be 
absorbed by increased real wage. Then, any tax cut is reflected more on real 








                                                 
4 At least, taxed less than income from work. 
5 The downward sloping labour demand curve represents, in an imperfectly competitive framework, the 
profit-maximizing combination of real-wage and employment for firms making employment and 
pricing decisions, given a predetermined nominal wage. 
6 The upward-sloping wage-setting curve represents either the no quitting/no shirking condition in 
efficiency wage models (that is the minimum wage, at any given level of employment that firms have 
to offer to discourage quitting or to keep workers motivated) or the result of wage negotiations in wage 
bargaining models. 
7 In the case of inelastic labour supply, an increase in taxation will also be passed on to net real wages 
(take-home pay) with little if any impact on labour cost and employment.  
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Figure 1 Impact of tax cuts on wage and unemployment under two different UI schemes
WS (taxed UB-Fixed NRR)






Et0 Et1 Et1 Employment rate
(Taxed UB) (Non taxed UB)
 
 
The result is also rather intuitive if we think about the role of unemployment 
as a discipline device (and the welfare reduction from a job loss) in most of 
the aforementioned partial equilibrium models, refraining wage demands8. 
Thus, if after a tax cut the unemployment benefits do not increase with the 
after-tax wage increases – (the case of non-taxed UB/fixed real level of 
benefits, not indexed to wages), the wedge between income if employed and 
income if unemployed, i.e. the cost of being unemployed, will increase. 
   
Changes in the tax burden, to the extent that they are reflected in a change in 
real labour costs, can also have an indirect impact on labour demand by 
changing domestic production costs relative to those of foreign competitors 
(Alesina-Perotti (1994)).  In this context, for example, a reduction of 
employers’ social security contributions can enhance the international 
competitiveness of a country, thereby acting like a real exchange rate 
depreciation9.  
 
Finally, in dynamic models, tax policies that reduce the prices of non-labour 
productive factors relative to labour tend to modify the relative factor 
intensities to the detriment of labour (in particular low-skilled labour). 
 
To see how the tax incidence is relevant, it is sufficient to look at the tax 
wedge between the real product wage (or real labour cost) paid by firms, RLC, 
and the real consumption wage of the worker RWC: 
                                                 
8 In the class of efficiency–wage (or incentive-wage) models, the role of unemployment is to increase 
the cost of dismissal and therefore to discipline workers behaviour on the job (not shirking or not 
quitting). 
9 This effect has been called the “internal exchange-rate depreciation” in the Scandinavian policy 
debate and it is one of the reasons behind the set-up of the “buffer stock” in Finland (Calmfors, 1998). 
This is also why changes in social security contributions and payroll taxes paid by employers are being 
suggested as counter-cyclical policy tools in EMU to support macro-stabilisation objectives.  
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P W RLC F / ) 1 ( τ + =  
) 1 ( / ) 1 )( 1 ( c A E t P t W RWC + − − = τ  
 
where W is the nominal gross wage,  P is the deflator of GDP at factor costs, 
F τ  is the rate of social security contributions paid by employers,  E τ  
employees’ social security contributions, tA  the tax rate on personal income 
and tc is the tax rate on consumption goods. Thereby the wedge is given by:  
 
Tax wedge = δ  = ) 1 )( 1 /( ) 1 )( 1 ( A E c F t t − − + + τ τ  and RLC = δ   *  RWC 
 
An increase in a component of the tax wedge δ   (personal income taxes, 
consumption taxes or SSCs) can increase the labour cost (the real product 
wage) for a given real consumption wage, or decrease real consumption 
wage, for a given labour cost. The relevant empirical issue here is whether 
and to what extent the total tax wedge is passed on into higher gross labour 
costs. The shift of a change in the tax wedge on the labour costs is likely to be 
higher, the greater the real consumption wage rigidity or the higher the wage 
elasticity of labour supply. In the extreme case of an infinite elasticity of 
labour supply (i.e. constant real wage), any change in taxation will be 
completely passed on labour costs to employers, with the higher impact on 
employment and no change in real after-tax wage. In the literature, this 
complete shift of taxes on labour cost is termed “real wage resistance”. It is 
referred to a situation where, a change of one of the components of the fiscal 
wedge (personal income tax, SSCs, consumption taxes) gives rise to a change 
in the real labour cost (taxes fall fully on the firm) because workers try to 
protect their living standards10. 
 
For example, a higher tax wedge through an increase in employers’ social 
security contributions could, all other things equal (for example in the 
presence of a wage floor due to minimum wages, non co-ordinated unions or 
benefit levels or a complete real wage resistance), raise the cost of labour, 
lower the price-competitiveness and ultimately increase unemployment. This 
will happen if the increase in the payroll tax cannot be passed onto workers in 
the form of lower wages (Blau-Kahn (1999)). 
 
The invariance of incidence proposition (IIP)  
In this paper we also test the so called “irrelevance theorem” or “invariance of 
incidence proposition” (IIP). The IIP implies that any change in the 
composition of the tax wedge, (for example, from SSCs paid by employees 
towards those paid by employers), does not affect labour costs and thus 
labour market outcome because the switch is supposed to leave the wedge 
                                                 
10 In more general terms real wage resistance occurs when workers seek recompense from any erosion 
of their real wage through whatever the source of such erosion (being decline in TFP productivity 
growth, increase in price levels or in tax rates)   
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between the producer costs and net take-home wage unchanged.  Theoretical 
models of wage setting assume that personal income tax, employers’ and 
employees’ tax rates and consumption tax rates have all the same impact on 
wages. Usually, the IIP is not even tested in empirical models but simply 
assumed, by estimating models that include only the overall tax wedge as 
explanatory variable (Goerke (1999)).  
 
Yet, there is a wide strand of literature that shows that even revenue-neutral 
shift of taxes on labour can alter labour market outcomes (e.g. Rasmussen 
(1997a), (1997b)).  For example, testing a wage equation for ten OECD 
countries, Knoester and Van der Windt (1987) find that the employers’ and 
employees’ tax rate have a larger impact on wage costs than indirect tax rates 
in the case of Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. For the United Kingdom, Layard and 
Nickell (1986) find that only the employers’ tax rate affects wages.  
 
The degree of shifting of social security contributions on wages is not only 
related to the real downward or upward wage rigidity and of the bargaining 
power of wage earners. It also depends on how workers value the benefits 
linked to the payment of SSCs. This tax/benefit linkage is well-known in the 
public finance theory (Musgrave (1959), Summers (1989) and Gruber (1995)). 
In theory, when benefits of social insurance are tied to the contributions, there 
exists a social insurance system where present discounted value of 
individual's contributions equals present discounted value of individual's 
benefits. Consequently, payroll taxes that are used to finance the provision of 
earnings related social security in such an optimal system should have little or 
no detrimental effect on labour supply and unemployment11.  If this linkage is 
considered in the model, a change in the payroll rate implies a change in the 
future benefits and, thus, in the (deferred) net wage. This should be 
represented by a shift of the supply curve as well. As a consequence, if 
workers value the benefits that they are buying with their payroll taxes, the 
impact of this change on the employment will be more limited, if any.  Along 
the same lines, Disney (2004) argues that to the extent that pension 
contributions are perceived as giving individuals rights to future pensions the 
potential adverse risks on employment are alleviated.  
 
Hence, the analysis of incidence relying only on the relative elasticity of 
labour demand and labour supply (or wage curve) is incomplete. Indeed, it is 
important to account for the link between tax and benefit (the stricter the 
relationship the higher the incidence on after-tax wage). An important 
qualification here is due to the presence of minimum wage, because in this 
                                                 
11 As stressed by Stiglitz (1999) “the major impact of social insurance depends on the difference 
between the (marginal) expected present discount values of benefits and contributions. In particular, the 
impact of social insurance financed by payroll taxes on the supply of labour depends on the precise 
specification of the system. By enabling individuals to see more clearly the link between the 
contributions and benefits, one reduces any adverse incentive effects arising from a failure to see the 
link”.  
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case firms cannot entirely shift onto workers the increase of SSCs. 
Furthermore, if gross wages are rigid downwards, they may react more 
flexibly to tax cuts than to tax increases. It follows that, a rise in the payroll 
taxes levied on firms might lead to higher labour costs if the payroll tax 
increases do not lead to a corresponding fall in the before-tax wage rate. This 
‘less-than-full-shifting’ of SSCs on wages is more likely when there are weak 
linkages between benefits and taxes or in the presence of downward wage 
rigidities induced by a binding minimum wage. When there is a full shifting, 
that is the incidence of changes on mandated employers’ SSCs is fully on after 
tax wages, there should also be only little if any impact on labour supply and 
thus employment because workers may consider the immediate reduction in 
net wages to be compensated by the insurance value or any future benefit 
bought by SSCs12.  
 
Empirical evidence on the impact of payroll taxation for different countries is 
mixed (Kugler & Kugler (2003)). Results range from full-shifting to little 
shifting and large disemployment effects. Gruber (1994, 1997) and Gruber and 
Krueger (1991), using cross-section and time-series variation in Chile for 
social security contributions and in the U.S. for disability insurance and 
maternity benefits, find full shifting of employer contributions on wages and 
no disemployment effects. As already mentioned, an important influence on 
the degree of tax shift is the presence of downward wage rigidities, which 
may make it more difficult to shift a large increase in payroll taxes on to 
workers. Furthermore, when wages are flexible upwards but not downwards, 
there could be full shifting in response to a large reduction in payroll taxes 
but not in response to a large increase.  Institutional aspects of wage 
bargaining are also important; usually, collective bargaining fixed contracts 
for the gross wage (e.g. wage costs excluding SSCs paid by employers).  Once 
the gross wage has been fixed, unanticipated increases in employers’ tax rate 
will, in the short run, cause a similar change in labour costs. On the contrary, 
unexpected increases in employees’ tax rate are absorbed by workers in terms 
of a lower net wage. Thus, at least in the short-run, unexpected changes in the 
employers’ and employees’ tax rate may have a different impact on labour 
costs. However, these effects due to nominal contracting are not likely to 
persist in the long-run (Graafland-Huizinga, (1995)). 
 
                                                 
12 This is the main result by Gruber (1995) with reference to the big reduction of the employers’ SSCs 
in Chile in 1981. It is well known from public finance literature that economic theory cannot give a 
precise prediction for the size and direction of the supply responses to tax changes due to the offsetting 
impacts of the income and substitution effects. From an empirical viewpoint, there is a general 
consensus that labour supply responses to tax/benefit  need to be distinguished by type of individual 
and labour market “segment” and  by whether these responses are related to a change in the hours 
worked or effort of work of those already in employment or a move from unemployment or inactivity 
to employment. The evidence on the importance of tax changes for labour supply is mixed. However, 
there is considerable evidence that high marginal tax rates can be relevant for age and gender specific 
groups (partners in couples where one spouse is not working, usually married women, and lone-parent 
families). On the contrary, tax (and benefit) changes seem far less likely to induce a relevant labour 
supply response for prime-age males.  
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Centralisation of wage bargaining and effects of labour taxes 
 
In this paper we also test the relevance of the degree of centralisation of wage 
bargaining. The argument of the well-known analysis by Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) is that both highly centralised (at national or multi-industry level) and 
decentralised (at the level of firms) bargaining systems perform better than 
intermediate ones (at the level of sectors/industries), as the co-operative 
behaviour of the former creates incentives to moderate wage claims while 
market forces restrain wages when bargaining occurs at the plant level. 
Hence, the relationship between wage levels and centralization is hump-
shaped. Wages are higher when bargaining occurs at the industry level than 
when it occurs at very centralised or very decentralised levels. Of course, in 
open economies wage restraint occurs also in intermediate systems. The 
hump-shaped curve becomes flatter the more open is the economy and/or the 
more competitive is the product market13. 
 
The hump-shaped curve predicted by Calmfors and Driffill becomes linear 
when one takes into account the influence of unions in the political process 
which leads to the determination of labour taxation and of its structure. 
Unions can be assimilated to large encompassing coalitions recognising the 
link between taxes paid by workers and the benefits they receive. The 
argument by Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993) is based on the idea that 
centralised unions look through the budget, and internalise the effect of their 
wage claims on the tax base and on the provision of public goods that enter 
into the union utility function. Hence, labour taxation is higher but less 
distorting. If unions are large enough, they recognise the linkage between 
taxes and benefits received, internalizing the aggregate consequences of their 
actions (Kiander, Kilponen and Vilmunen (2000)). Centralised unions 
recognise that higher wages lead to a drop in employment, in the tax base 
and, finally, in the provision of public goods. The wage moderation effect of 
public good is higher, the higher the marginal utility from public good is 
(Kilponen and Sinko (2003)). In the model of Summers et al., countries with 
centralised unions perform better than both intermediate and decentralised 
systems14. Hence, when compared to countries with decentralised wage 
setting, countries with centralised bargaining should have higher income 
taxes, as means of income redistribution, and higher employment15. An 
                                                 
13 When there are strong externalities across industries, the relationship between wages and the extent 
of centralisation becomes downward sloped (i.e. the level of wages decline with the level of 
centralisation of bargaining. Given the negative relation between employment and wages, the level of 
employment rises with the level of centralisation/co-ordination). See Calmfors (1993). 
14 In Calmfors and Driffill (1988) the mechanisms driving the externality works through the link 
between wages and prices, while in Summers et al the connection between wages and government 
budget is decisive. In the former there are two levels of internalisation of price externalities: a micro 
level working at the firm level and a macro level working at the aggregate demand level. In the latter, 
internalisation only occurs at the macro level. This implies the superiority of centralised systems on any 
other bargaining system in the model by Gruber et al. 
15 Wage moderation of centralised wage bargaining systems occurs also with endogenous supply of 
hours worked. However, in the context of a median voter model, the only possible cost implied by  
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increase in the average tax rate reduces the after-tax pay because the unions 
internalise the effect on the provision of public goods and do not fully 
compensate for the increase in the tax as they do in the decentralised case.  
 
When individuals and unions derive utility from the provision of a public 
good financed through general taxation, the effects of a change in the average 
tax rate depends on the degree of union’s “encompassment”, i.e. the degree in 
which a centralised union compensates the effect of its wage policy on the 
provision and financing of the public good (Kilponen and Sinko (2001)). With 
centralised union, higher (lower) taxes lead to a lower (higher) after-tax wage. 
In contrast, with decentralised unions changes in the average tax rate are fully 
compensated by changes in the before tax wage (i.e. the after tax income 
remains unchanged). Hence higher taxes on wages are less harmful for 
employment in centralised systems. Similarly, a reduction in the average tax 
has lower effects on employment with centralised bargaining.  
 
 The empirical evidence (Daveri and Tabellini (2000)) seems to support the 
view that in more corporatist countries labour taxes are less distortionary (i.e. 
the effect on unemployment is lower) than in countries where wage 
bargaining is less centralised but not fully decentralized. In particular, 
distortionary effects of labour taxes are found to be largest in countries with 
intermediate (industrial) level wage-bargaining systems. 
 
III.  Empirical findings to date 
 
Despite the notable amount of research devoted to the issue, empirical 
findings on the degree of real wage resistance and therefore on the final 
incidence of taxes on labour is mixed and remains highly controversial. As 
stressed by Gruber (1995), problems of biased estimates due to omitted 
variables, cross-country differences in wage-setting correlated with tax rate 
differences, or contemporaneous time series changes in other variables which 
determine wages, not controlled for in the estimation are among the major 
pitfalls of existing empirical works.  
 
Although wage resistance and tax-push phenomena seem different in 
different countries, in different times and for different fiscal policies (Padoa 
Schioppa Kostoris (1992) and Tyrväinen (1995)), there is some evidence of 
wage resistance and therefore of a significant and long-lasting impact of taxes 
on labour costs and unemployment in many European countries, especially of 
continental Europe (Daveri and Tabellini, (2000), Marino and Rinaldi (2000)). 
A tax cut is also more likely to have a greater positive impact on employment 
in countries where there is either a highly decentralised bargaining system or 
a high degree of centralisation or co-ordination of unions and therefore a 
                                                                                                                                            
higher taxation is the reduction in the take home pay. In this case, the relationship between degree of 
centralisation and optimal tax rate is ambiguous ((Kilponen and Sinko (2001)).   
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higher internalisation of the beneficial effects of wage moderation on 
employment and macroeconomic performance (a confirmation of the well-
known Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis)16. 
 
According to some (Nickell-Layard (1997), (1999)), the balance of empirical 
evidence suggests that, in the long-run, a kind of “tax neutrality” holds. In 
theoretical terms this is equivalent to say that in the long run, in a perfectly 
competitive model, the labour supply is considered vertical. In a wage-
bargaining model this is equivalent to assume that the (upward or 
downward) shift of the price-setting and the wage-setting curves is of equal 
amount. There is probably some wage resistance in the short-term but not in 
the long-term, although the transition to the long–term can be very long and 
therefore the short-term impact and the dynamics of adjustment can be long-
lasting. As a result, there should be only a rather limited adverse effect of tax 
on unemployment and labour input, and the precise size of this effect remains 
unclear (Nickell-Layard (1999)).  Furthermore, in a small open economy with 
international capital mobility, the expected rate of returns on domestic and 
foreign investment must be the same. Thus, in the medium-long term real 
labour costs are tied down by this equivalence condition. Hence, in the 
medium-long term any increase in tax wedge (labour taxes) will be entirely 
borne by labour (Nickell (1997)). 
       
To sum up, the final labour market outcome of a change in taxation depends 
on all the institutional factors (unions, wage setting mechanisms, minimum 
wage, unemployment benefits, EPL) which, by impinging on both product 
market and labour market functioning17, affect the degree of tax shifting and 
the final incidence of taxation on the production wage (labour cost) and/or 
the consumption wage (take-home wage). Moreover, these institutional 
factors are also apt to change over time as a result of structural reforms. 
Therefore, it is also difficult to predict the actual impact on the labour market 
of a change in tax policy on the base of past experiences. 
 
Some descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the overall tax wedge for two different socio-economic 
groups. The tax wedge is a measure of the non-wage component of the labour 
costs and is defined as the difference between the after-tax and the before-tax 
labour costs as a percentage of total before-tax labour costs. The average tax 
wedge used in this paper is the one calculated by the OECD and covers annual 
data for the period 1980-200018.  We use the tax wedge for a single person 
                                                 
16 Alesina and Perotti (1994), Scarpetta (1996), Marino and Rinaldi (2000). 
17 The degree of product market competition is also relevant in determining the degree of wage-
resistance. To the extent that employers share the “monopoly rents” of firms in a market with low 
competition, increases in taxation on labour are more likely to be shifted forward into product prices, 
because of low firm resistance against compensatory wage claims.  
18 See OECD-Taxing Wages publication. The OECD tax indicators are the result of microeconomic 
simulations for a set of stylised taxpayers whose income from labour range below and above the  
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(without children) working in the manufacturing sector at the average wage 
level as a proxy for the average tax wedge referred to the entire working 
population.19.  
 
There are large cross-country differences which also persist over time, 
mainly within rather than between each of the two decades considered. 
Moreover, when countries are ranked according to the level of the tax wedge, 
those countries with a relatively low wedge in the first half of the 1980s 
(Austria, Spain, Germany and Greece) worsened their relative position in the 
second half of the 1990s.  
 
In countries such as the UK, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, taxes on 
labour declined during all the 1980s and the 1990s while in Denmark, Italy, 
Portugal, Sweden and Ireland this downward trend started only in the 1990s. 
For the remaining countries the wedge increased, with increases after 1995 
coming to a halt or being more moderate in the case of France and Greece and 
going further up in the case of Germany. In the case of a married couple with 
children, there is less variation of the tax wedge over time but the time pattern 
is similar to that observed for the “single worker with no children”.  
 
Table 2 shows the wide difference in the composition of the tax wedge across 
Member States and its evolution over the period 1980-2000. The composition 
of the wedge highlights clear differences across countries in the pattern of 
reduction of the overall tax burden on labour or in its distribution among 











                                                                                                                                            
“average production worker” (hereafter APW) wage level, which is taken up as a benchmark in cross-
country comparisons. They differ from “effective” (or implicit) tax rates based on macroeconomic data, 
which convey different ex-post and aggregate (nation-wide) information on the fiscal pressure.  The 
figures show how much personal income tax and social security contributions are paid by employers 
and employees. Calculations are available for different family types (single, one-earner and two earner 
households) and various wage levels. 
19 This is a reasonable assumption. Indeed, the OECD produces measures referred to 6 different family 
types, but the correlation across countries of the tax wedge for different family types is rather high and 
stable over time (see for example results in Table 1 for the two categories “single worker with no 
children” and “married couple with two children”). Hence countries with a high level of the tax wedge 
for the former category also tend to have over time a high level of the wedge for the latter. This 
correlation is of at least 0.8 and  give good reason for considering one of the family type as statistically 
representative of the others.  
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Table 1 – Tax wedge 
 
     
  Single without children 100% of APW  Married couple with two children one-earner 
100 % of APW 
 1980-1984  1985-1989 1990-1995 1996-2002  1980-1984 1985-1989  1990-1995  1996-2002
Austria  38.2 39.8 39.6  44.8  27.6 28.7  28.0  33.4 
Belgium  50.0 52.6 54.2  56.6  39.7 41.9  41.1  44.1 
Denmark  44.5 47.4 46.3  44.5  36.6 37.0  34.0  33.1 
Spain  36.4 36.8 37.5  38.4  32.5 32.8  32.8  32.5 
Finland  43.8 45.8 48.1  48.5  36.1 37.6  40.1  44.5 
France  38.7 41.2 43.4  44.1  : :  41.4  41.2 
Germany  43.0 45.0 47.2  51.8  34.0 34.7  36.1  35.5 
Greece  28.5 32.5 33.9  35.8  15.1 30.1  33.3  35.7 
Ireland  37.9 41.8 38.9  32.9  26.4 31.1  29.8  23.3 
Italy  48.1 50.3 49.3  48.7  43.6 45.7  44.4  42.8 
Luxembourg  38.3 36.6 34.7  34.7  20.2 17.5  15.0  13.6 
Netherlands  49.7 49.1 46.0  44.0  44.3 43.3  39.5  36.2 
Portugal  30.9 34.4 33.6  33.7  27.6 30.7  27.2  27.6 
Sweden  50.7 51.8 47.3  50.3  45.9 47.0  42.8  46.8 
United 
Kingdom 
38.4 35.9 33.1  31.5  29.9 27.5  26.2  26.1 
Source: own calculation on OECD data, Taxing Wages various issues. The tax wedge is computed as the sum of 
income tax, employers' and employees' social security contributions as a percentage of gross earnings and 
employers' social security contributions. 
 
 
Table 2  
The tax wedge structure in 1980-2000 -Single at APW wage level , no children
Ranking
Position 
Change Change Change Change Change
2000-1980 2000 2000-1980 2000-1980 2000-1980 2000-1980
BELGIUM 21.0 8.5 10.5 3.0 24.7 -4.7 35.2 -1.7 56.2 6.8 1
DENMARK 32.3 -5.6 11.6 7.4 0.5 0.0 12.1 7.4 44.4 1.8 10
GERMANY 17.2 1.9 17.0 3.4 17.0 3.4 34.0 6.9 51.3 8.8 3
GREECE 1.4 na 12.4 na 21.9 na 34.3 na 35.7 na 14
SPAIN 9.3 1.0 4.9 0.5 23.4 2.3 28.3 2.8 37.6 3.8 13
FRANCE 10.3 na 9.6 na 28.2 0.0 37.8 na 48.1 na 5
IRELAND 13.5 -8.6 4.6 0.5 10.7 2.0 15.3 2.5 28.8 -6.1 18
ITALY 14.2 5.8 6.9 1.4 25.4 -4.8 32.3 -3.4 46.4 2.3 7
LUXEMBOURG 11.2 na 12.0 na 11.9 na 24.0 na 35.2 na 15
NETHERLANDS 7.4 -5.6 25.0 8.3 13.7 -5.3 38.7 3.1 46.1 -2.5 8
AUSTRIA 6.3 -1.4 14.0 2.6 24.7 7.0 38.7 9.7 45.0 8.3 9
PORTUGAL 5.4 1.3 8.9 2.2 19.2 2.2 28.1 4.4 33.5 5.8 16
FINLAND 21.0 -3.7 5.6 3.1 20.6 2.6 26.2 5.7 47.2 2.0 6
SWEDEN 19.5 -8.3 5.3 5.3 24.8 2.6 30.0 7.8 49.5 -0.4 4
UNITED KINGDOM 14.5 -6.0 7.2 1.3 8.6 -3.5 15.8 -2.2 30.3 -8.2 17
HUNGARY 13.1 na 8.8 na 29.5 na 38.3 na 51.4 na 2
POLAND 5.4 na 20.6 na 17.0 na 37.6 na 43.0 na 12
CZECH Rep. 7.8 na 9.3 na 25.9 na 35.2 na 43.0 na 11
2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Income Tax 
Social security contributions Total tax 
wedge Employee Employer Total  SSCs
 
Source: OECD, Taxing Wage, various issues. 
 
In general, countries with the highest tax wedge are also those with the 
highest social security contributions (SSCs), in particular those paid directly 
by employers. In 2000 total SSCs ranged from 30% to slightly less than 40% of 
labour cost in most European countries, notably exceptions being Denmark,  
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the United Kingdom, Ireland, Luxembourg and Finland.  In particular, 
employers’ SSCs ranged from 20% to about 30% of labour costs in half of the 
member states (Finland, France, Greece, Spain, Austria, Sweden, Italy and 
Belgium). In Denmark the low overall SSCs (about 11%) is compensated by 
relatively high personal income tax as a percentage of labour cost. 
 
Charts 1-3 show the correlation of the unemployment and the 
employment rate with the tax wedge. This relation is complex and dominated 
by country-specific patterns, with significant differences in both the cross-
country and the cross-time comparisons. Across countries and in different 
periods, the correlation between the tax wedge and the unemployment and 
employment rate is almost zero.  
 
However, although not easy to interpret in terms of causality, within 
each country there is a significant time correlation between labour taxes and 
employment performance. In Member States such as Germany, Greece, Spain, 
France, Ireland, and to a lesser extent, Austria, high (low) unemployment rate 
is associated with high (low) tax wedge and vice versa20. For the Scandinavian 
countries, Belgium and Finland the correlation, that was negative in the 1980s, 
became significantly positive in the 1990s. Compared to the 1980s, it markedly 
decreased in the 1990s in Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Besides, 
with only few exceptions, the correlation between the unemployment rate and 
the tax wedge is higher in the first half than in the second half of the 1990s, 
and in both sub-periods higher than in the whole decade. This suggests that 
there is an important role for the time dimension of the relationship linking 
taxes with unemployment which cannot be understood if the focus is on a 
cross-country comparison at a certain point in time. 
 
These findings do not change significantly when the correlation is 
calculated with respect to the employment rate or the structural 
unemployment rate (charts 2-3). The time correlation between labour taxes 
and structural unemployment is usually highly significant and even higher 
than that between taxes and actual unemployment rates. As expected, a 
negative correlation between taxes on labour and employment rates is found 
for almost all Member States (chart 3). 
 
This first look at the data shows that, although the cross-country 
correlation between  unemployment and the tax burden on labour is not very 
significant - i.e. countries with high taxes on labour and high employment  
coexist with countries with high taxes on labour and low employment - the 
within country time correlation is important. Unemployment is not necessary 
high (low) in countries with high (low) tax wedge, but, in most countries, it 
tends to be higher after increases in the wedge. This implies that changes in 
the tax wedge are likely to account more for the country-specific response of 
                                                 
20 Since a correlation does not imply in any sense causality, it is equally correct to say that countries 
with high (low) tax wedge had also high (low) unemployment rate.   
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the (un)employment rate than for the cross-country differences at a certain 
point in time. Although bivariate correlations are not indicative of the 
direction of causality between two variables21, the existence of significant 
correlation is suggestive of labour taxes being a factor affecting labour market 
performance. This first evidence suggests that the mechanism relating taxes to 
labour market performance is not simple. Since employment and 
unemployment react often with lags, such dynamics should be properly taken 
into account in order not to underestimate the long-run impact on 
employment.   
 
                                                 
21 A significant correlation between the two variables is equally consistent with a causality from taxes 
to unemployment and vice versa. Apart from the expected causality from labour taxes to 
(un)employment, a shock leading to unemployment may require an increase in the level of taxes 
necessary to provide direct or indirect transfers to the unemployed. Besides, the correlation of 
(un)employment with taxes, can be highly significant but the effect of taxes quantitatively extremely 
small.  
Unemployment rate and tax wedge












1980-1989 1990-2000 1990-1995 1996-2000
Chart 1
NAIRU and tax wedge












1980-1989 1990-2000 1990-1995 1996-2000
Chart 2
Employment and tax wedge












1980-1989 1990-2000 1990-1995 1996-2000
Chart 3 
  - 17 -
 
IV.  Econometric methodology and results 
 
IV.1    Methodology 
 
Since we want to study the interactions between the bargaining system and 
the tax wedge, a natural candidate to depict the wage formation mechanism is 
the right-to-manage model. In this model unions and firms bargain over the 
wage level given the labour demand. Firms then choose the number of 
employees they wish once wages have been set. When the production 
function is of a Cobb-Douglas, the real labour costs are the log(sum) of the 
firm specific factors (price and productivity), “outside” factors 
(unemployment rate, the tax wedge, the reservation wage) and the tax wedge. 
In the annex we review the role of taxation in search, efficiency wage and 
union bargaining models taking the Walrasian labour market as a benchmark 
against which we compare models of imperfect labour markets. 
 
In broad terms we have the following general form for the wage equation 
 
() ρ τ τ τ , , , , , , , ) 1 ( u t t P f W C E F A c F ∏ = +  
where  ) 1 ( F W τ + is the labour cost, Pc is the consumer price index, Π  is labour 
productivity, u the unemployment rate, ρ  the gross replacement rate, tA , tc, τ F, 
and  τ E respectively the average income tax, the consumption tax rate, the 
employers’ and employees’ social security contributions.  
 
The models considered so far assume that wages are continuously on the 
labour supply or, in imperfectly competitive models, on the wage curve. 
Nevertheless, wages can deviate from the long run equilibrium either because 
of overlapping wage contracts or delayed adjustment. Neglecting such 
dynamics may lead to biased estimates of the impact of labour taxes on the 
wages. A general dynamic linear specification of the wage equation for a 
panel of i countries and t periods which also allows for country specific effects 
is as follows: 
 









t i t i t i
C
t i t i i t i
L L t L
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ε τ γ τ β α
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where rlc is the (log) real labour costs, pc the (log) consumer price index, π  the 
log (labour productivity), u the unemployment rate.  As a proxy for indirect 
taxation (tc) we used the price wedge (ratio between the consumption and the 
GDP deflators), which contains information on indirect taxation, but also on  
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import prices and terms-of-trade shocks. ρ  is the gross replacement rate, while 
the last three terms in the equation are the components of the tax wedge22. 
 
In order to check the robustness of results against alternative methods, the 
above equation has been estimated applying three different techniques (OLS 
fixed effects, Within Group (WG) and Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM)) to a balanced panel of 15 EU Member States over the period 1979-
2000. It is well known that in dynamic panels the presence of fixed effects 
makes the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent. The WG estimator wipes 
out the fixed effects but does not solve the problem. It still suffers from bias in 
dynamic models due to the correlation between lagged dependent variable 
(real labour costs) and the average across time of the disturbances23. Another 
problem concerns the treatment of endogenous variables (i.e. the lagged 
dependent variable and other possible endogenous explanatory variables). To 
address these problems, the dynamic wage equation is estimated using the 
first difference GMM (GMM-dif) estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)), with 
the instrument matrix defined on the basis of the assumptions made on 
whether the explanatory variables are exogenous, endogenous or 
predetermined. The procedure uses lags of the dependent variable and, 
eventually, of other explanatory variables as instruments. However, when the 
number of time periods is small, the time series highly persistent and there 
are relatively important country idiosyncratic individual effects, the GMM-dif 
estimator looses its efficiency. In this case the system GMM (GMM-sys) 
estimator is more appropriate (Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998))24. GMM estimates can be based on a one step or on the 
asymptotically more efficient (with heteroskedastic errors) two step 
estimators. Monte Carlo simulations (Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998)) showed that the standard errors of the two steps estimator 
are biased downwards in small samples (i.e. the t statistics are unduly high). 
Under these circumstances, the one-step estimator with standard errors 
corrected for the heteroskedasticity should be preferred. 
 
Although the OLS and the WG estimates of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable are biased, respectively upwards (Hsiao 2002) and 
downwards (Nickell 1981), we are using them because they provide bounds 
within which the consistent GMM estimate of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable lies (Blundell et al. (2000)). As required, in order to get 
consistent GMM estimation we use lags of the dependent variable in levels as 
                                                 
22 The econometric technicalities and the data source are described in the annex. 
23 The bias disappears as T gets large but the within transformation does not necessarily eliminate the 
endeogeneity between the error term and possible predetermined variables. 
24 The GMM-sys estimator gives a more precise estimate of the autoregressive parameter than the 
GMM-dif when series are highly persistent, i.e. the parameter is close to unity. For a panel of 100 
individuals and 7 time periods, Monte Carlo simulations by Bårsden et al. (2004) of a dynamic 
equation with an exogenous variable generated by a persistent AR(1) process show that the bias of the 
GMM-dif estimator is enormous for small values of the coefficient of the explanatory variable while 
the GMM-sys overestimates but its bias is not affected by the coefficient of the explanatory variable. 
However, the bias in the coefficient of the explanatory variable is never so dramatic.   
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instruments for the lagged dependent variable in first differences. The 
validity of these instruments is checked with the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions (which verifies the lack of correlation between errors 
and instruments) and with a test of absence of serial correlation of residuals, 
since the moment conditions are valid if the error term is not serially 
correlated. In equations in first differences, first order autocorrelation is 
expected even when the original errors are serially uncorrelated, unless they 
follow a random walk. Moreover a GMM-dif estimate not far from the WG 
estimate is an indication of weak instruments requiring a GMM-SYS 
estimator. 
 
We present the results checking their robustness with respect to different 
econometric techniques and alternative definitions of the tax variables. All 
variables are expressed as deviation from period means so that we do not 
have to include time-specific dummies to account for a common component 
in the determination of real wages25. Usually, nominal wages respond 
positively to increases in producers’ and consumers’ prices. Since we were not 
able to reject the homogeneity assumption suggested, to get a more 
parsimonious equation we expressed labour costs in real terms (nominal 
labour costs deflated with the consumer price index).  
IV.2   Main results  
 
The dynamic wage equations using different methods are reported in Table 
326. The findings seem to be robust to alternative econometric techniques and 
provide indication of a rich dynamics. The validity of the specification comes 
from the value of the GMM Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the 
absence of autocorrelation (insignificant first and significant second order 
negative serial correlation)27.  
 
Turning to the estimates, the value of the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable suggests that real labour costs are highly persistent leading us to 
choose the GMM-SYS as preferred estimates. As expected, in GMM-SYS the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable lies between the OLS and the WG 
estimate. Productivity has a positive contemporaneous effect, while the 
coefficient of lagged productivity is negatively signed. An increase by 1% in 
the level of productivity raises the real labour costs by about 0.5% in the 
short-run. This increase partly wanes one year later but tends to be 
transferred on higher real wages when the dynamics has worked its effects 
out (the static solution of the dynamic equation in Table 3a). The 
                                                 
25 In symbols,  for any variable xit the period t mean is calculated averaging over countries i. Hence, the 
generic variable used in the econometric analysis has the form t it x x − . 
26 The results are obtained with the software  PCGIVE10. 
27 The equation is estimated in first differences. If the error term is uncorrelated in the equation in 
levels differentiation introduces an MA(1) process and should thus fail a test of first order negative 
autocorrelation but not a test of second order autocorrelation.   
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corresponding long run elasticity of 0.91 suggests that real wages rise in line 
with productivity growth, which implies a constant wage share. However, a 
formal test of homogeneity with respect to productivity gives a p-value at 
about 1% and thus leads to reject the null at 5% of significance28. This finding 
suggests that in the period covered by our dataset real wages grew less than 
productivity and that the wage share declined - a well-known stylised fact of 
the 80s and 90s. 
 
Indirect taxes (captured by the ratio of consumption deflator and GDP 
deflator) have a negative and significant contemporaneous impact on real 
labour costs. A 1% increase in the consumption deflator relative to the GDP 
deflator leads to a decline in real labour costs by about 0.8%. This decline is 
only temporary and compensated by labour costs' increases during the 
following two years. The fact that the price wedge does not have a statistically 
significant impact in the real labour costs in the long run implies that the 
nominal gross wage change as much as the consumer price. Hence, any 
change in the consumer price level in response to a change in the price wedge 
is transferred completely on the nominal labour costs.  
The tax wedge has a positive impact on the real labour cost, but only in the 
short-run. In the case of GMM-SYS estimate, a one percentage point increase 
in the tax wedge raises contemporaneously real labour costs by 0.10% 
(implied elasticity 0.04)29. This figure implies that a 10% increase in the tax 
wedge (say from 40% to 44%) leads to an increase in the real labour costs by 
0.4% (i.e. 0.04*10)30.  
 
Hence, an increase in labour taxation is largely offset in the short-run by a 
reduction of the real after-tax wage. In the long-run, the coefficient of the tax 
wedge is statistically insignificant, implying that any change in the tax wedge 
                                                 
28 The linear restriction H0: A3(1)=1- A1(1) gives a χ (1)
2 =6.17 with a p-value of 0.013. When the same 
test is run on DIF-GMM, we get χ (1)
2 =0.03 with a p-value of 0.87; on WG χ (1)
2 =0.09 with a p-value 
of 0.75; on OLS estimates χ (1)
2  =0.25 with a p-value of 0.61. Hence, in 3 out of 4 cases the 
homogeneity hypothesis cannot be rejected by the data. Nevertheless, the findings of the GMM-SYS 
should be preferred for the reasons already mentioned in the text. 
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where τ  is the group average over the sample period. The percentage increase in the real labour costs 
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 used to get the percentage 
point increase are 0.71 and 0.29.  
30 In the case of the Dif-GMM estimate, a one percentage point increase in the tax wedge 
raises contemporaneously real labour costs respectively by 0.14% with an elasticity of 0.06.  
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is entirely shifted on consumers as lower (or higher in the case of decreases) 
after–tax real wage. This result appears in line with those in Nickell et al. 
(1999) and is consistent with either an iso-elastic union utility function or with 
unemployment benefits indexed to the after tax wages (i.e.: constant net 
replacement rate). Yet, this result needs a qualification. Indeed, given the high 
degree of persistency in real labour costs, an increase in the tax wedge, 
although temporary, tends to have long-lasting effects on the real labour 
costs. 
 
 Finally, the short-run effect of the unemployment rate is significant and with 
the expected negative sign. High unemployment rates lead to low real labour 
costs, with a corresponding long-run elasticity broadly in line with that found 
by many microeconomic studies (0.1%)31. Therefore, there is only a weak 
feedback from unemployment to real wages which does not exclude insider 
hysteresis effects.  
IV.3    Alternative specifications: inclusion of unemployment benefits, non-linearity 
effects and different tax indicators  
The specification has also been estimated controlling for the gross 
replacement rate. The coefficient is not statistically significant in all cases32. 
The model has been re-estimated using the traditional indicator of the tax 
wedge based on tax revenues from national accounts data33 (Table A2 in the 
annex). The estimates are robust across different methods of estimation and 
alternative definitions of the wedge and confirm the findings of Table 3. We 
have also tested the possibility of non-linearity in the response of real labour 
costs to a change in the tax wedge, as an increase in the tax wedge may have 
different effects than a decline. However, this form of non-linearity is not 
supported by the data. When we separate the effect of taxation on labour costs 
when the wedge is increasing from the effect when it is declining, a test of 






                                                 
31 The long-run unemployment elasticity of real wages is -0.14 and is obtained, to get rid of the semi-
log form, by multiplying the coefficient of unemployment in table 4a (-0.02) times 7.72% (the average 
unemployment rate in our sample over the period 1979-2000). Our estimate of the elasticity is not far 
from the so-called “universal value” (-0.1%) found by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). Hence, a 
doubling of the unemployment reduces wages by about 10%. 
32 Although this finding is in line with that of Daveri and Tabellini (2000), it should be recalled from 
the theoretical analysis that it is the net replacement rate that should affect the real labour costs. 
However, a time series for the net replacement rate is not available. Results are not reproduced here but 
are available upon request. 
33 We use implicit tax rates calculated by Martinez-Mongay (2000).  
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LIST OF VARIABLES 
RLCOMPCM: real labour costs (rlc) 
LPRODM: labour productivity (π ) 
LREALCM: price wedge (tc) 
LWEDGEM: log(1+tax wedge) 
LWEDGEMN: LWEDGEM when wedge is decreasing  







SSCM: social security contributions as % of gross wage 
LPERSTAXM: (income tax + employees’ social security contributions) as % of gross wage 
U: unemployment rate 
 
Table 3  Short-run wage equation: endogenous explanatory variables  
 (Balanced panel 1979-2000) 
 OLS  Within  Dif-GMM  Sys-GMM 
RLCOMPCM(-
1) 
0.98*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 
LPRODMe  0.50*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 
LPRODMe(-1)  -0.48*** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.42*** 
LREALCM  -0.84*** -0.81*** -0.81*** -0.85*** 
LREALCM(-1)  0.59*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 
LREALCM(-2)  0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 
LWEDGEM  0.008 0.17**  0.20**  0.15** 
U(-1)  -0.0005* -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.0012*** 
      




  : : :  
Ar(1): m1-test  0.06 0.10  0.013  0.007 
Ar(2):m2-test  0.83 0.50 0.18 0.18 
Obs.  300 300 300 300 
 
Table 3a  Implied long-run wage equation 
 OLS  Within  Dif-GMM  Sys-GMM 
































Student t in parentheses m1 and m2 are tests of first- and second- order serial autocorrelation asymptotically N (0, 
1); p-values reported. Note that in the case of the GMM-dif estimator the difference transformation generates 
MA(1) errors and, thus, with first order autocorrelation. However, the disturbances in the difference equation are 
2nd order uncorrelated when the disturbances in the level equation are 1st order uncorrelated. m2 tests for second 
order autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals. * Significant at 10% level; * * significant at 5% level; * * * 
significant at 1% level. In dif-GMM instruments are RLCOMPCMt-2, LWEDGEMt-1, LREALCt-1 and all further 
lags. In Sys-GMM additional instruments for level equations are RLCOMPCMt-1 LWEDGEMt-1, LREALCt-1  
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IV.4    Testing the role of centralisation 
 
The next question we have investigated is whether centralisation of wage 
bargaining influences the degree of shifting of taxes on real labour cost. As 
already discussed in section 2, the relation between wages and employment 
may depend on the extent of centralisation and co-ordination of wage 
bargaining. In order to identify the role of centralisation we have used 
different data sets. The first is based on the data set assembled by Golden, 
Lange and Wallerstein (henceforth GLW)34; the second dataset is based on the 
taxonomy of Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (henceforth EMS) 35; the third on 
the labour market institutions data base by Nickell and Nunziata (henceforth 
NN). The role of centralisation and co-ordination of bargaining is analysed in 
Table 4 which reproduces the estimates of the wage curve but with the effects 
of the tax wedge conditional to the specificities of centralisation/coordination 
of wage bargaining. 
 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the wage equation with the OLS and WG 
(columns 1-2). It also shows GMM-Dif estimates (columns 3-5) under different 
assumptions on the endogeneity of the tax wedge and the price wedge36. 
Finally columns 6-8 display the GMM-SYS estimates under different 
assumptions on the extent to which the instruments used in dif-GMM3 are 
informative37.  With OLS the tax wedge is significant, although with an 
unexpected negative sign, in both systems with low and intermediate levels of 
coordination/centralisation. The signs turn positive with the WG estimator 
but the coefficients are different from zero (at the 10% level of significance) 
only when the level of low coordination is low. When we control for the 
endogeneity of the tax wedge, this effect is always statistically significant in 
countries with both low and high level of coordination/centralisation of 
bargaining; by contrast real labour costs are not sensitive to variations in the 
tax wedge when the extent of coordination is at the intermediate level. 
However, the OLS estimate of real labour costs on itself lagged once is close to 
1 and supports the choice of the more efficient GMM-SYS estimator38. In this 
                                                 
34 Golden, Lange and  Wallerstein (2002) Dataset available at http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/data. 
Version dated September 19, 2002. See also Annex. 
35 We use the summary measure of centralisation/co-ordination reported by Elmeskov, Scarpetta and 
Martin (1998). The data refer to the period 1983-1995. From 1995 on the index takes the values of 
1995. 
36 In Dif-GMM1 only the lagged dependent variable is considered endogenous. In Dif-GMM2, in 
addition to the lagged dependent variable, the tax wedge is a further endogenous variable. Finally, in 
Dif-GMM3 the lagged dependent variable, the tax wedge and current and lagged values of the price 
wedge are endogenous.  
37 In GMM-SYS the instruments used in Dif-GMM3 (i.e. model with all explanatory variables 
endogenous) are considered weak because of the persistency of the lagged dependent variable (GMM-
SYS1) , the tax wedge (GMM-SYS2) and the price wedge (GMM-SYS3). 
38 GMM-SYS2 is our preferred estimate for the following reasons: 1) GMM-SYS1 control only for the 
effects of the persistency on instruments for the lagged dependent variable; 2) however, the 
autocorrelation coefficient in a AR(1) regression of the tax wedge gives a coefficient of 0.99 which 
supports the use lagged first differences of the tax wedge as additional instruments in the equation in  
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case, if one is ready to accept very imprecise estimates, there is an indication 
that the tax wedge has an impact on the real labour costs only when 
centralisation and co-operation is high (SYS-GMM2)39.  
 
For both the productivity and the price wedge variables, the previous 
findings are confirmed when the same equation is estimated using the 
classification of bargaining level in the GLW dataset (Table 5)40. The tax 
wedge has a significant impact on the real labour costs in systems with 
industry and sectoral level wage settings (Barglev23 and Barglev45) only 
when we control for the endogeneity of lagged real labour costs and of the 
price wedge. In this case, with sectoral wage setting the impact of the tax 
wedge is twice as much as that obtained for industry wage setting. However, 
when we control for the endogeneity of the tax wedge, its effect on real labour 
costs turns significant but with a negative sign only when the wage setting is 
at the plant level (i.e. in the UK). In our preferred estimate (SYS-GMM2, see 
footnote 36), the tax wedge is correctly signed but statistically insignificant. 
These results are broadly in line when the measure of the level of 
coordination is the NN CO1 index (Table 6). Although the tax wedge has a 
positive impact on the real labour costs, there is no evidence that this impact 
is stronger when the extent of coordination is high rather than low.  
                                                                                                                                            
levels; 3) the AR(1) regression of the price wedge gives a coefficient far from 1 (0.88) and, thus, there 
is no reason to use the lagged first difference of the price wedge in the equation in levels as additional 
instruments. This is confirmed by the coefficients of GMM-SYS3 not different from those in GMM-
SYS2.  
39 The evidence is only mildly supportive because the coefficient of the tax wedge in high bargaining 
systems is not precisely estimated – the t-value is 1.60 corresponding to a probability of 0.12. We also 
run regressions of the real labour costs equation without the price wedge, under different assumptions 
on the informativeness of the instruments and on the endogeneity of the tax wedge. The results, not 
reported for brevity, indicate real wage resistance only in the case of low bargaining systems. 
40 However, the GLW and the EMS data base are not strictly comparable. In GLW  four Member States 
are missing while in EMS only two.   
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Table 4  Short-run wage equation: interaction of LM institutions (Elmeskov et al.) and tax wedge 
(Balanced panel 1979-2000) 
  OLS WITHIN  Dif-GMM1  Dif-GMM2  Dif-GMM3 GMM-SYS1 GMM-SYS2 GMM-SYS3 
RLCOMPCM(-1)  0.98*** 0.98*** 0.95***  0.96***  0.97***  0.95***  0.95***  0.94*** 
LPRODMe  0.52*** 0.52*** 0.54***  0.50***  0.52***  0.50***  0.50***  0.50*** 
LPRODMe(-1)  -0.50*** -0.46*** -0.46***  -0.44***  -0.45***  -0.45***  -0.45***  -0.45*** 
LREALCM  -0.76*** -0.72*** -0.67***  -0.71***  -0.72***  -0.76***  -0.76***  -0.78*** 
LREALCM(-1)  0.44*** 0.47*** 0.30***  0.46***  0.46***  0.41***  0.42***  0.46*** 
LREALCM(-2)  0.39*** 0.37*** 0.44***  0.38***  0.37***  0.41***  0.40***  0.37*** 
LWEDGEM LOW  -0.04** 0.16*  0.28*  0.18**  0.15**  0.14*  0.12  0.11 
LWEDGEM INT  -0.04*** 0.05  0.16  0.10  0.07  0.06  0.03  0.04 
LWEDGEM HIGH  0.03 0.16  0.27**  0.20* 0.17* 0.11  0.12  0.11 
U(-1)  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0011***  -0.0011*** -0.0011***
              












Ar(1): m1-test  0.11  0.08  0.034  0.032  0.030  0.022  0.022  0.020 
Ar(2):m2-test  0.96 0.63 0.49  0.43  0.43  0.44  0.45  0.43 
Obs.  260 260 247  247  247  260  260  260 
m1 and m2 are tests of first- and second- order serial autocorrelation asymptotically N(0,1); p-values reported. Note that in the case of the GMM-
dif estimator the difference transformation generates MA(1) errors and, thus, with first order autocorrelation. However, the disturbances in the 
difference equation are 2nd order uncorrelated when the disturbances in the level equation are 1st order uncorrelated. m2 tests for second order 
autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals.  
* Significant at 10% level; * * significant at 5% level; * * * significant at 1% level.  
In Dif-GMM1 instruments are UM(-1), LPRODMe, LPRODMe(-1), RLCOMPCM t-2, and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM2 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM1 further instruments are LREALCM t-1, and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM3 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM2 further instruments are LWEDGEMt-1, and all further lags.  
In GMM-SYS1 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM3 further instruments are levels of RLCOMPCM t-1 
In GMM-SYS2 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM3 further instruments are levels of LWEDGEM t-1 
In GMM-SYS3 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM3 further instruments are levels of LREALCMt-1 
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Table 5  Short-run wage equation: interaction of LM institutions (Golden et al.) and tax wedge 
(Balanced panel 1979-2000) 
  OLS WITHIN  Dif-GMM1  Dif-GMM2  Dif-GMM3 GMM-SYS1 GMM-SYS2 GMM-SYS3 
RLCOMPCM(-1)  0.98*** 0.84*** 0.76***  0.84***  0.84***  0.94***  0.96***  0.96*** 
LPRODMe  0.49*** 0.51*** 0.55***  0.49***  0.51***  0.49***  0.48***  0.48*** 
LPRODMe(-1)  -0.48*** -0.33*** -0.33***  -0.32***  -0.33***  -0.44***  -0.44***  -0.44*** 
LREALCM  -0.80*** -0.78*** -0.80***  -0.75***  -0.78***  -0.80***  -0.77***  -0.80*** 
LREALCM(-1)  0.47*** 0.40***  0.30  0.36**  0.40***  0.45***  0.45**  0.49*** 
LREALCM(-2)  0.39*** 0.36*** 0.39***  0.40***  0.36***  0.44***  0.43***  0.40*** 
LWEDGEM 
*Barglev1 
-0.086***  0.16*  -0.12 0.04  -0.11***  0.04 0.076 0.02 
LWEDGEM*Bargl
ev23 
-0.02 0.05  0.07**  0.07* -0.009 0.06  0.049 0.03 
LWEDGEM*Bargl
ev45 
-0.03* 0.16 0.11*  0.14*** 0.08  0.10*  0.049  0.04 
U(-1)  -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.0025***  -0.002***  0.11*  -0.0011*** -0.0011***
              












Ar(1):  m1-test  0.64 0.47 0.06 0.044  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Ar(2):m2-test  0.67 0.80 0.72  0.66  0.62  0.70  0.70  0.67 
Obs.  220 220 209  209  209  220  220  260 
m1 and m2 are tests of first- and second- order serial autocorrelation asymptotically N(0,1); p-values reported. Note that in the case of the GMM-
dif estimator the difference transformation generates MA(1) errors and, thus, with first order autocorrelation. However, the disturbances in the 
difference equation are 2nd order uncorrelated when the disturbances in the level equation are 1st order uncorrelated. m2 tests for second order 
autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals. * Significant at 10% level; * * significant at 5% level; * * * significant at 1% level.  
In Dif-GMM1 instruments are current levels of UM(-1),LPRODMe, LPRODMe(-1), and current levels of RLCOMPCM t-2, and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM2 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM1 further instruments are current levels LREALCM t-1, and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM3 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM2 further instruments are current levels LWEDGEMt-1, and all further lags.  
In SYS-GMM1 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM3 further instruments are levels of RLCOMPCM t-1 
In SYS-GMM2 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM3 further instruments are levels of LWEDGEM t-1 
In SYS-GMM3 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM3 further instruments are levels of LREALCMt-1  
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Table 6  Short-run wage equation: interaction of LM institutions (Nickell et al.) and tax wedge 
(Balanced panel 1979-2000) 
  OLS WITHIN  Dif-GMM1  Dif-GMM2  Dif-GMM3  Dif-GMM4  GMM-SYS1  GMM-SYS2 
RLCOMPCM(-1)  0.98*** 0.96*** 0.95***  0.95***  0.96***  0.96***  0.95***  0.95*** 
LPRODMe  0.51*** 0.51*** 0.53***  0.50***  0.51***  0.51***  0.50***  0.50*** 
LPRODMe(-1)  -0.49*** -0.44*** -0.45***  -0.43***  -0.45***  -0.44***  -0.45***  -0.46*** 
LREALCM  -0.77*** -0.73*** -0.67***  -0.71***  -0.72***  -0.73***  -0.77***  -0.76*** 
LREALCM(-1)  0.43*** 0.45*** 0.29***  0.38***  0.45***  0.45***  0.41***  0.41*** 
LREALCM(-2)  0.38*** 0.37*** 0.46***  0.40***  0.38***  0.37***  0.41***  0.41*** 
LWEDGEM  -0.01 0.14*  0.24***  0.24***  0.17** 0.14*  0.08  0.08 
WEDGEM*CO1M  0.048 0.01  0.03  -0.03  0.01  0.01  0.008 0.008 
U(-1)  -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
              












Ar(1): m1-test  0.14  0.12  0.034  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02 
Ar(2):m2-test 0.88  0.65  0.507  0.461  0.45  0.43  0.44  0.45 
Obs.  260 260 247  247  247  247  260  260 
m1 and m2 are tests of first- and second- order serial autocorrelation asymptotically N(0,1); p-values reported. Note that in the case of the GMM-
dif estimator the difference transformation generates MA(1) errors and, thus, with first order autocorrelation. However, the disturbances in the 
difference equation are 2nd order uncorrelated when the disturbances in the level equation are 1st order uncorrelated. m2 tests for second order 
autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals. * Significant at 10% level; * * significant at 5% level; * * * significant at 1% level.  
The interacting variable is expressed as deviation from pooled means. Hence, it takes value zero at the average level. The coefficient of WEDGE 
is interpreted as the effect for the “representative” country. 
In Dif-GMM1 instruments are current levels of UM(-1), LPRODMe, LPRODMe(-1), current levels of RLCOMPCM t-2 and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM2 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM1 further instruments are current levels of LWEDGEM t-1 and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM3 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM2 further instruments are current levels of  WEDGEM t-1*CO1M t-1 and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM4 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM3 further instruments are current levels of LREALCM t-1 and all further lags.  
In SYS-GMM1 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM4 further instruments are levels of RLCOMPCM t-1 
In SYS-GMM2 in addition to instruments in SYS-GMM1 further instruments are levels of WEDGE t-1  
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IV.5    Testing the invariance of incidence proposition 
 
Turning to the role of the composition of the tax wedge, evidence of GMM 
estimation of wage equations  (Table 7) suggests that the composition matters 
only in the short-run, while in the long-run the so-called “invariance of 
incidence proposition“ holds41. In the short-run, employers’ social security 
contributions have a positive and statistically significant impact on real labour 
costs, which is of about the same order as the effect of the income tax rate. 
Real labour costs are estimated to rise by about 0.10%  when the income tax 
rate rises by 1 percentage point (implied elasticity 0.02), while they rise by 
0.07% for a 1 percentage point increase in the employers’ social security 
contributions (implied elasticity 0.02). On the contrary, the impact of 
employees’ social security contributions is not statistically significant, 
meaning that any change in this component is completely shifted on gross 
wages.  
 
One problem with Table 7 is that the income tax rate and the employees’ 
social security contributions tend to be negatively correlated (chart 4 and 
Table 8). In this case the estimates of the coefficient tend to have large 
standard errors. We have addressed this problem re-estimating the 
regressions with direct taxation aggregated with employees’ social security 
contributions in the variable personal taxation (Table 9). Personal taxation has 
a positive and statistically significant impact on real labour costs when we 
control for the endogeneity of lagged real labour costs only or also for the tax 
variables (personal taxation in GMM2 or personal taxation and employers’ 
social security contributions in GMM3). However, when we apply the more 
efficient GMM-SYS estimator, the coefficient of personal taxation turns out 
statistically insignificant. In contrast the impact of employers’ social security 
contributions appears robust to different assumptions on persistency and 
endogeneity of variables.  
 
This result can be explained by institutional aspects of wage bargaining. Once 
the gross wage has been fixed, in the short run an unanticipated increase in 
the employers’ tax rate will be mainly shifted on labour costs. On the 
contrary, an unexpected increase in the employees’ personal income tax is 
absorbed by workers in terms of a lower net wage. 
 
A further check of the invariance of incidence proposition is provided by 
Table 10, where employers’ and employees’ social security contributions have 
been aggregated in the social security contributions variable. With the 
exception of the biased and inconsistent OLS estimate, the income tax rate and 
the social security contributions are statistically significant.  
                                                 
41 Because  of the lack of a statistically significant long-run impact of any component of the tax wedge, 
the invariance incidence proposal is a sort of “super-neutrality”.  
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Table 7  Short-run wage equation: effects of tax wedge components 
(Balanced panel 1979-2000) 
  OLS Within  Dif-GMM  Sys-GMM  AH-IV1  AH-IV2 
RLCOMPCM(-1)  0.98*** 0.93***  0.93*** 0.92***  -0.08  0.37 
LPRODMe  0.48*** 0.48***  0.50*** 0.48***  0.53*** 0.55*** 
LPRODMe(-1)  -0.47*** -0.41***  -0.40*** -0.41***  0.07  -0.17 
LREALCM  -0.84*** -0.82***  -0.79*** -0.81***  -0.87*** -0.84*** 
LREALCM (-1)  0.59*** 0.56***  0.54*** 0.54***  -0.40  0.002 
LREALCM (-2)  0.30*** 0.32***  0.35*** 0.35***  0.15***  0.30 
LSSCLM  -0.0152 0.14  0.21  0.09  0.07  -0.013 
LINTAXM  -0.011 0.09  0.16**  0.12** 0.19*  0.12 
LSSCFM  0.005 0.07**  0.10***  0.09***  0.05  0.06 
U(-1)  -0.0006** -0.002*** -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002*  -0.002*** 
            





Ar(1): m1-test  0.06  0.10  0.014  0.01  0.49  0.90 
Ar(2):m2-test 0.751  0.47  0.20  0.20  0.78  0.82 






















Obs.  300 300  285 285  285 285 
m1 and m2 are tests of first- and second- order serial autocorrelation asymptotically N(0,1); p-values 
reported. Note that in the case of the GMM-dif estimator the difference transformation generates MA(1) 
errors and, thus, with first order autocorrelation. However, the disturbances in the difference equation are 
2nd order uncorrelated when the disturbances in the level equation are 1st order uncorrelated. m2 tests for 
second order autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals.  
 
In Dif-GMM1 instruments are current levels of UM t-1, LPRODM t , LPRODM t-1, LREALCM t , 
LREALCM t-1, LREALCM t-2,  LINTAXRATEM t , and current levels of LSSCLRATEM t and 
RLCOMPCM t-2 and all further lags.  
In SYS-GMM1 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM4 further instruments are levels of RLCOMPCM t-1 
In AH-IV1 instruments are first differences of dependent variable lagged twice (RLCOMPCMt-2-RLCOMPCMt-3) 
In AH-IV2 instruments are levels of the dependent variable lagged twice (RLCOMPCMt-2) 
* Significant at 10% level; * *  significant at 5% level; * * *  significant at 1% level 
 
 
Table7 Implied  long-run  wage  equation: effects of tax wedge 
components 
  OLS Within  Dif-GMM  Sys-GMM  AH-IV1  AH-IV2 
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Table 8     Correlation of income tax rate with the  
  AT  BE DE DK EL ES FI  FR IE  IT  LU NL PT SE UK 
Employees social security 
contributions    -0.3  0.8 0.9 -0.9 0.0 0.6 -0.4 -0.4 0.6 0.4 -0.7 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 0.0 
Employers social security 
contributions  0.2  -0.6 0.9 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.6 0.6 0.3 -0.5 0.6 
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Table 9  Short-run wage equation: effects of tax wedge components 
(Balanced panel 1979-2000) 
  OLS Within  Dif-GMM1  Dif-GMM2  Dif-GMM3  SYS-GMM1  SYS-GMM2  SYS-GMM3 
RLCOMPCM(-1)  0.98*** 0.93***  0.91***  0.92*** 0.93*** 0.93***  0.94***  0.95*** 
LPRODMe  0.50*** 0.49***  0.49***  0.49*** 0.47*** 0.48***  0.49***  0.49*** 
LPRODMe(-1)  -0.48*** -0.41***  -0.39***  -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.41***  -0.43***  -0.44*** 
LREALCM  -0.84*** -0.81***  -0.83***  -0.77*** -0.81*** -0.86***  -0.87***  -0.85*** 
LREALCM (-1)  0.58*** 0.56***  0.46***  0.52*** 0.56*** 0.52***  0.56***  0.55*** 
LREALCM (-2)  0.32*** 0.33***  0.43***  0.35*** 0.34*** 0.41***  0.40***  0.38*** 
LPERSTAXM  0.0005 0.10  0.23***  0.14** 0.12* 0.09  0.08  0.06 
LSSCFM  0.003 0.07**  0.08*  0.07* 0.07**  0.06** 0.09**  0.07** 
U(-1)  -0.0005** -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.001**  -0.001** 
               












Ar(1): m1-test  0.06  0.10  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.009  0.008  0.008 
Ar(2):m2-test 0.83  0.51  0.21  0.20  0.18  0.19  0.19  0.19 
Obs.  300 300  285  285 285 300  300  300 
m1 and m2 are tests of first- and second- order serial autocorrelation asymptotically N(0,1); p-values reported. Note that in the case of the GMM-dif estimator the 
difference transformation generates MA(1) errors and, thus, with first order autocorrelation. However, the disturbances in the difference equation are 2nd order 
uncorrelated when the disturbances in the level equation are 1st order uncorrelated. m2 tests for second order autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals.  
In Dif-GMM1 instruments are UM(-1),LPRODMe,LPRODMe(-1),RLCOMPCM t-2 and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM2 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM1 further instruments are LPERSTAX t-1 and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM3 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM2 further instruments are LSSCFM t-1 and all further lags. 
In SYS-GMM1 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM3 further instruments are levels of RLCOMPCM t-1 
In SYS-GMM2 in addition to instruments in SYS-GMM1 further instruments are levels of LPERSTAXMt-1 
In SYS-GMM3 in addition to instruments in SYS-GMM2 further instruments are levels of LSSCFMt-1 
* Significant at 10% level; * *  significant at 5% level; * * *  significant at 1% level 
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Table 10  Short-run wage equation: effects of tax wedge components 
(Balanced panel 1979-2000) 
  OLS Within  Dif-GMM1  Dif-GMM2  Dif-GMM3  SYS-GMM1  SYS-GMM2  SYS-GMM3 
RLCOMPCM(-1)  0.98*** 0.93***  0.92***  0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93***  0.95***  0.95*** 
LPRODMe  0.49*** 0.49***  0.48***  0.48*** 0.48*** 0.47***  0.48***  0.48*** 
LPRODMe(-1)  -0.47*** -0.41***  -0.39***  -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.41***  -0.44***  -0.43*** 
LREALCM  -0.84*** -0.81***  -0.83***  -0.81*** -0.82*** -0.87***  -0.82***  -0.82*** 
LREALCM (-1)  0.59*** 0.55***  0.46***  0.52*** 0.55*** 0.56***  0.52***  0.58*** 
LREALCM (-2)  0.31*** 0.33***  0.45***  0.35*** 0.33*** 0.39***  0.40***  0.33*** 
LINTAXRATEM  0.02 0.08*  0.16**  0.10**  0.07*  0.12**  0.10***  0.10*** 
LSSCM  0.003 0.09**  0.11***  0.11***  0.08** 0.06*  0.05*  0.05* 
U(-1)  -0.0006** -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001** 












Ar(1): m1-test  0.05  0.10  0.015*  0.014  0.013  0.008  0.008  0.007 
Ar(2):m2-test 0.79  0.49  0.20  0.19  0.18  0.19  0.20  0.19 
Obs. 300  300  285  285  285  300  300  300 
m1 and m2 are tests of first- and second- order serial autocorrelation asymptotically N(0,1); p-values reported. Note that in the case of the GMM-dif estimator the 
difference transformation generates MA(1) errors and, thus, with first order autocorrelation. However, the disturbances in the difference equation are 2nd order 
uncorrelated when the disturbances in the level equation are 1st order uncorrelated. m2 tests for second order autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals.  
In Dif-GMM1 instruments are UM(-1),LPRODMe,LPRODMe(-1),RLCOMPCM t-2 and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM2 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM1 further instruments are LSSCRATEM t-1 and all further lags.  
In Dif-GMM3 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM2 further instruments are LINTAXRATEM t-1 and all further lags. 
In SYS-GMM1 in addition to instruments in Dif-GMM3 further instruments are levels of RLCOMPCM t-1 
In SYS-GMM2 in addition to instruments in SYS-GMM1 further instruments are levels of LSSCRATEMt-1 
In SYS-GMM3 in addition to instruments in SYS-GMM2 further instruments are levels of LINTAXRATEMt-1 
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Table 11 shows the implied real labour costs elasticity and the percentage change in 
the real labour costs due to a percentage point increase of the different components 
of the wedge. These figures have been calculated applying the formula in footnote 
31. We distinguish the relevant parameters in the case of different definitions of the 
labour taxation. Panel (a) reports the results when employees’ social security 
contributions are lumped together with the income tax rate in a personal income tax 
rate. Panel (b) displays the case of employers’ and employees social security 
contributions aggregated in the social security contributions rate. For convenience 
the Table also reports the same coefficients of Table 9 and 10. 
 
The following facts stand out. Firstly, the impact of employers’ social security 
contributions is robust across different estimation methods. According to our 
estimates a 10 percentage point decline (that is from 30% to 20% of the gross wage) 
in the employers’ social security contributions may reduce real labour costs by about 
0.5%-0.7%. Secondly, the impact of personal taxation (the sum of employees’ social 
security contributions and income tax rate) is uncertain and sensitive to the 
estimation methods42. A similar result applies in the case of social security 
contributions and the income tax rate. In addition, the empirical evidence supports 
the view that the statutory incidence is irrelevant while the economic is not. Indeed, 
a shift in the tax burden from employers to employees (in the form of either higher 
social security contributions or higher income taxation) that leaves unchanged the 
total wedge is not associated with any significant reduction in the real labour costs 
(i.e. labour costs remain unchanged or even increase). Finally, an increase in the 
social security contributions (either of employers or of employees) to compensate a 
reduction of the income tax rate will be associated to a slight reduction in the real 
labour costs. This last result implicitly suggests that wage setters perceive the 
existence of a link between benefits and social security contributions, while this link 
is weaker in the case of the general taxation. It is consistent with the conclusions of 
Disney (2004) on the impact of social security contributions on activity rates, 
supporting pension reforms that increase the linkage between contributions and 











                                                 
42 The impact is the largest when we treat the tax rate variables as exogenous (Gmm1)  and tend to decrease (and to be 
more uncertain) the larger is the set of endogenous tax variables (Gmm2 and Gmm3 that take as endogenous 
respectively the personal tax rate and employers’ social security contribution in addition to the personal tax rate). 
However, when we use the GMM-Sys estimator to account for the problem of weak instruments due to the high 
persistency of the variables, the coefficients are less sensitive to the endogeneity hypothesis made for labour taxation. 
43 Disentangling the tax component of pensions’ payroll contributions from the non-tax component (i.e. forced savings), 
Disney finds that only the tax component of contributions reduces activity rates, especially among women.  
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Table 11 a  SHORT TERM IMPACT ON REAL LABOUR COSTS 
   
  Gmm1  Gmm2  Gmm3  Sys1 Sys2 Sys3 
  Personal income tax rate  
Coefficients  0.23*** 0.14** 0.12*  0.09 0.08 0.06 
Elasticity  0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
% increase in 














        
  Employers’ social security contributions rate  
Coefficients  0.08* 0.07* 0.07** 0.06** 0.09** 0.07** 
Elasticity  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
% increase in 
















Table 11 b  SHORT TERM IMPACT ON REAL LABOUR COSTS 
        
  Gmm1  Gmm2  Gmm3  Sys1 Sys2 Sys3 
  Social security contributions rate  
Coefficients  0.11*** 0.11*** 0.08** 0.06* 0.05* 0.05* 
Elasticity  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.015 0.012 0.012 
% increase in 














        
  Income tax rate 
Coefficients  0.16** 0.10** 0.07* 0.12** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
Elasticity  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
% increase in 















V.    Conclusions 
 
In many empirical analyses the issue of the tax incidence has been addressed 
assuming the invariance of the composition of the wedge. In a standard framework, 
we have investigated how real labour costs respond to changes in the tax wedge and 
in each of its components, controlling for the labour productivity, the 
unemployment rate and the price wedge. Besides, most of the studies of the tax 
incidence are static, which implies that wage setters are always on their wage curve 
or the labour supply. This assumption does not consider the existence of dynamic 
adjustment with the consequence that the impact of a change in the tax wedge is 
likely to be biased, especially when real labour costs are highly persistent. A 
dynamic specification of a wage equation for the EU countries allows distinguishing 
the short term from the long term effects. Nevertheless, with a dynamic specification 
the traditional estimators used for the static methods are not without problems 
while estimators of GMM family have been developed for a panel with a large 
number of individuals and small time periods. Rather than choosing one technique 
this paper presents results obtained with the main techniques used in the literature.  
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The credibility of these results should be higher if they are similar regardless of the 
technique used.  
 
Our findings suggest that there is probably some wage resistance in the short-term 
but not in the long-term, although the transition to the long-term can be very long 
and therefore the short-term impact and the dynamics of adjustment can be long-
lasting. In the short-term, an increase in the tax wedge has an impact on the labour 
cost and thus on employment, although limited. Our estimates suggest that a 1 
percentage point increase in the tax wedge leads to a contemporaneous increase in 
the real labour costs by 0.1%, slightly below the un-weighted average of the 
coefficients found for the EU Member States by Alesina and Perotti (1994) and Padoa 
Schioppa Kostoris (1992) respectively of 0.2% and 0.14%44. The empirical results in 
this paper are in line with those found on many occasions by Nickell and Layard, 
(1991, 1994, 1999), who argue that in the long-term the tax wedge leaves equilibrium 
unemployment unaffected. On the other hand they partly contrast with the results 
of Daveri-Tabellini (2000), who find that higher taxes lead to higher gross wages in 
continental Europe (but not elsewhere, in particular certainly not in the USA and the 
UK). 
 
Turning to the role of the different components of the tax wedge - employers’ and 
employees’ social security contributions, income tax rate – their short-run effects on 
real labour costs differ but not substantially: the null hypothesis of equal coefficient 
cannot be rejected. In addition, the temporary but persistent effects of the different 
components of the wedge tend to disappear in the long-term, implying a sort of 
“super neutrality” of labour taxes.  
 
 The findings yield important policy implications. First, the lack of a significant long- 
term influence of the tax wedge on wage costs implies that tax policy has only a 
limited (if any) impact on the overall equilibrium unemployment. Yet, the long-term 
total shift of changes in taxation on net wages may have relevant impact on the 
labour supply of those groups of people that are more responsive to changes in 
after-tax wages. The effect of labour taxation on relative employment performance 
of different groups is an important topic for further research.  
 
Although limited to the short term, an increase in the employers’ social security rate 
or in the income tax rate is likely to be partially translated on labour costs. Overall, 
in our sample of the EU 15 member states, we have found only a limited short-term 
“real wage resistance”. This also implies that any reduction of the tax wedge cannot 
be expected to have a major impact on labour cost and thus on unemployment and 
employment (unless one assumes a high elasticity of labour supply) because it will 
mostly accrue to workers in terms of higher real take-home wage.  
  
The composition of the tax wedge is relevant but only in the short-term. A shift from 
employers’ to employees’ social security contributions may lead to a reduction in 
labour costs in the short-term. According to our estimates, a reduction in the average 
                                                 
44 Alesina and Perotti (1994) and Padoa Schioppa Kostoris (1992) have a definition of the tax wedge that omits 
as our does the consumption tax rate. See Nickel and Layard (1999, pp 3060 table 18).   
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income tax rate accompanied by an increase in the employees’ social security 
contributions can be an option to reduce both real labour costs and enhance the link 
between contributions and benefits. Moreover, given that social security 
contributions have a lower impact on real labour costs than income taxation 
(probably reflecting, although weak, workers’ perception of a linkage between 
benefit and social security contributions), a shift from the former to the latter that 
leaves unchanged the tax wedge will risk increasing the real labour costs also in the 
short-term.   
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Annex 
A1- Taxation and labour market: an overview of some theoretical aspects 
 
1) The perfect competition model 
 
It is well-known that in a perfect competitive labour market the labour demand is a 
decreasing function of the real wage. An increase in the payroll tax reduces labour 
demand at any wage rate. When each consumer derives utility from consumption and 
leisure, the utility function is concave in both arguments, and preferences are homothetic, 
labour supply is increasing in the income level and in the after-tax real consumption wage.  
 
Profit maximisation and log-linearisation of the first order condition ( () ( ) τ + = 1
' W L f ) yields 
the demand for labour:  )   ) (log( ) log( τ α + − = W L with  0   ' ' / ) 1 ( < + − = L f w τ α  the elasticity of labour 
demand and τ  the payroll tax. Each household maximises a concave utility function 
() L L C U − 0 ,  defined on consumption and leisure. The budget constraint is 
() T WL Y C t P c − + = + 1  where  () WL T T = is a general tax function with marginal rate tm. In 
equilibrium the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals the 
















1 0 . The after tax real consumption wage 
includes both the marginal income tax rate tm and the consumption tax rate tc. Log-
linearising the consumer’s first order condition and assuming homothetic preferences 
yields the following labour supply 
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the initial share of non-labour income in total income and σ  the elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure which, in the case of homothetic preferences, is equal to 
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. tA, tm, tc are respectively the average, the marginal and the 
consumption tax rates. When the substitution effect prevails over the income effect (σ >1), 
the labour supply is increasing in the real wage.  
 
The market-clearing wage and employment levels are set to equate labour demand and 
labour supply. Assuming for simplicity that the share of non-labour income is zero (ω Y=0), 
the consumer and producer real wages are respectively:  
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In atomistic labour markets, the side that is legally taxed does not bear the entire tax 
burden. The legal incidence of the tax differs from the economic incidence and the impact 
of payroll taxes is distributed on both producers’ and consumers’ wage according to the 
elasticity of labour demand and labour supply. When labour supply is not completely 
inelastic, labour taxes are partially shifted on employers via higher labour costs. With 
inelastic labour supply (   0   =
M
W ε ), the tax is entirely shifted on labour through the gap 
between real consumption and real production wage: the production wage does not 
change while the consumption wage falls by as much as the increase in the payroll tax. 
Payroll taxes are fully shifted as lower real consumption wages and there are no dis-
employment effects.   Finally, if the tax system becomes more progressive (i.e. tm  -ta 
increases) wages rises and employment falls. A similar result holds i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e 
consumption tax rate. 
 
Downward wage rigidity may, however, limit the ability of firms to pass payroll taxes in 
the form of lower wages. This is likely to occur in the more realistic case of non-Walrasian 
labour markets. We will review the role of taxation in search, efficiency wage and union 
bargaining models.   
 
2) Search and matching models  
 
Search and matching models emphasise the presence of heterogeneity, information 
imperfections about potential trading partners, low mobility that generate labour market 
frictions (e.g. Pissarides 2000). The presences of frictions introduce monopoly rents which 
affect job creation and job destruction. The outcome of the exchange process between 
those seeking a new job and those posting new vacancies is described by the matching 
function (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000)). Inputs are the existing stocks of unemployed 
and vacancies and output the flow of new hires. The Beveridge curve is the locus in the 
unemployment and vacancy space that equates inflows and outflows from 
unemployment:  





where s is  the (exogenous) rate at which workers quit jobs, θ =v/u  a measure of labour 
market tightness, q(θ )=m(u,v)/v the probability of filling a job and θ q(θ )=m(u,v)/u the 
probability of finding a job, m(u,v) a constant returns to scale matching function. The 
expected cost of filling a vacancy equals the sum of the producer wage and the capitalised 








+ + ) 1 ( . Labour demand is obtained from the usual first order 
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' . After the employer and employee have formed a match,  
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they have to decide about the payments accruing to each other. The standard assumption 
is that the rents associated to the match are shared between workers and firms as in a 
generalised Nash bargaining over wages. The equilibrium wage is determined maximising 
the payoff minus the threat point of one agent raised to a power β  times the payoff minus 
the threat point of the other agent raised to 1-β . The surplus generated by the match is split 
among the two parties according to the relative bargaining strength. For the worker and 
the firm the payoffs coincide respectively with the value of being employed and the value 
of a filled job. Similarly, the threat points are the value for a worker of being unemployed 
and the value for a firm of not filling a job. In symbols the wage struck in a match solves 
the problem 
() () () ( ) () ()
β β τ
− − + − −
1 1 1 max V w J U t w W A w  
 yielding the first order condition  
() () () ()() () ()
w
J
U t w W
w
W
V w J A ∂
∂
− − − =
∂
∂
− + 1 1 1 β τ β  
which can be solved for w once the value W, U, J and V of the four possible states 
describing the match (employment, unemployment, filled job, vacant job) have been 
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In equilibrium rents to vacant jobs should be driven to zero (i.e. no rents can be distributed 
to vacant jobs!), hence we have the “free entry” condition V=0 implying that
) (θ q
c
J = : the 
value of the match J is increasing in the recruitment cost c and decreasing in the 
probability of filling a job. Plugging this condition in the value of filling a job (J) we obtain 










 - i.e. the probability of finding a job equals 
the capitalised recruitment costs relative to the net return for the employer of an occupied 
job. Alternatively, the last expression says that the value of the match J equates the net 
gain for a firm from an employed worker. Substitution of the value functions in the 





















































                                                 
45 Each expression can be seen as the neutrality condition of being in one state.   












is an index of tax progression46. The wage is a weighted average of the 
unemployment benefit b and of the productivity of a match (marginal productivity plus 
the opportunity cost due to the saving of further search when the match occurred). Wages 
depend positively on the market tightness θ  because the expected cost for the firm of 
finding another match increases with θ . For a given consumer average tax rate A t , an 
increase in the payroll tax τ  reduces the after tax wage w(1-tA), and is partially shifted onto 
higher labour costs. Also the labour demand (or the zero profit condition) shifts 
downward, because it reduces the value of the match. The net effect is lower after tax 
wage, lower tightness and higher unemployment. Finally an increase in the extent of tax 
progression raises the marginal cost of higher wages and induces wage moderation. 
 
The degree of shifting depends on the relative bargaining strength. The higher is the 
bargaining strength of the employer the lower is the degree of shifting of payroll taxes on 
labour costs. This result occurs because when the bargaining strength of the employee is 
low the equilibrium wage is not far from the unemployment benefits b, which sets a floor 
in bargaining. When the actual wage is not far from the unemployment benefits the 
possibility for the firm of transferring higher pay-roll tax on the worker are limited. The 
same reason explains why wage moderation induced by tax progression decreases with 
the bargaining strength of the employer47.  
 
With unemployment benefits indexed to the after-tax wage (or taxed at the same rate as 













































In this case, the wage curve is steeper than with fixed (or untaxed) unemployment benefits 
when the degree of tax progression S is lower than the replacement rate ρ .  
 
                                                 
46 Note that S is different from the separation rate s. 
47 If the employer sets the wage (β  is relatively low) then a high degree of tax progression does not moderate wage 



















. If the 
productivity of the match (including the opportunity cost due to the saving of further search when the match 



















sign  which is always 
strictly greater than zero for β  and S between zero and 1 . Therefore an increase in the bargaining power of 
the firm (a lower β ) limit the wage moderation of the tax progression.   
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3) Efficiency wage models 
 
In this class of models, wages are both a cost factor and an incentive device. A higher after-
tax wage increases the cost of production but also boosts worker’s efficiency and labour 
productivity. Consequently, firms may find optimal to raise wages above the perfect 
competitive level to retain, motivate and attract workers. The representative firm chooses 
the level of wages and employment that maximises profits taking into account the effect of 
wages on workers’ efficiency. In equilibrium the Solow condition states that the elasticity 
of the effort with respect to the wage is equal to one. Given the optimal wage, labour 
demand is determined equating the marginal productivity of labour to the wage:  
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Suppose that the effort function depends on the indirect utility of the wage offered by the 
firm relative to the indirect utility of the outside option (Van der Ploeg (2003))48:  
()
ε ) ( ( )) 1 ( ( )) 1 (( ( A A i A i t B V t w V t w e − − = −  
 
Firms are assumed to have a linear production function in the effort function and labour: 
Yi=eiLi. Substituting the effort function in the Solow condition and taking into account the 
relationship between average and marginal tax rate with general tax function, we get  
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Maximisation of profits with respect to Li yields ei=(1+τ )wi. The outside reference wage is 
equal to the unemployment benefits with probability u and to the wage in other firms with 
probability 1-u:  bu u t w t B w b V A A + − − = ) 1 )( 1 ( )) , , ( ( . When utility is given by the constant relative 














t w V , where γ  is the degree of risk aversion, the 











) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1
1
γ ε γ .  A 
higher efficiency wage effect (ε ), a less progressive tax system, a higher unemployment 
benefits (b) raise unemployment. An increase in the after-tax wage  () A t w − 1  reduces 
unemployment.  
 
When the replacement rate () A t w b − = 1 / ρ  is constant or the gross unemployment benefit b is 
taxed at the average tax rate tA, a change in the marginal or average tax rate modifies 
unemployment only when the degree of tax progression changes.  Contrary to what is 
found for the perfect competitive model, a more progressive tax system (higher tm-tA) 
                                                 
48 The indirect utility v(p,Y) is the maximum utility attainable  at given prices and income : 
Y pc   . .    ) ( max ) , ( ≤ t s c u Y p v   
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reduces the unemployment rate. Moreover, higher payroll tax rates do not affect 
equilibrium unemployment, implying that consumers bear the burden of the tax.  
 
When the replacement rate is not fixed (either because the gross unemployment benefits 
are fixed or not taxed) the impact of average and payroll taxes depends on their effects on 
the consumer and the producer wages. Combining the equilibrium unemployment and 
the relationship between effort and labour cost we get the following expressions for the 
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Hence, higher payroll-taxes are shifted more on producers than consumers. When 
consumers are risk neutral (γ =0) who bears more the burden of the payroll tax depends on 
the efficiency wage effect not being too strong (in particular ε <1). Otherwise it is 
transferred more on producers than consumers. When γ =1, consumers bear 100% of the 
burden of the payroll tax.  
 
In efficiency wages models, the producer wage is not a sufficient statistics for 
unemployment because wage restraint does not lead to lower unemployment since also 
effort depends on wages. The effect on unemployment depends on the unemployment 
benefit regime. When gross unemployment benefits are not indexed to the after tax wage 
w(1-tA) or not taxed, an increase in the payroll tax or in the average tax rate increases after-
tax wage w(1-tA) and, thus, the replacement rate and raises the unemployment rate. When 
the gross unemployment benefits are taxed at the same rate as labour income the 
replacement rate is fixed and, independently of the level of taxation, the unemployment is 
high when the replacement rate is high.   
 
In a model a-lá Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), workers produce one unit of labour unless they 
shirk. With imperfect monitoring the firm also sets the wage to avoid shirking. The firm 
chooses a wage that makes it optimal for the worker not to shirk (i.e. it satisfies the no 
shirking conditions). In equilibrium the wage paid by the firm is such that the expected 
value of working is equal to the expected value of shirking. The resulting unemployment 
is involuntary and acts as a workers’ discipline device to avoid shirking or too frequent 
quits. As in the Walrasian case, the payroll tax shifts down the labour demand while it 
does not affect the wage offer. Hence, an increase in the tax reduces employment (along  
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the no-shirking condition) and the equilibrium wage. If workers recognise the link 
between benefits and contributions, a payroll tax not only reduces the labour demand but 
also flattens the no shirking condition, reducing the impact on equilibrium employment 
(Kugler and Kugler 2003). When this link is perfect, the shift in the labour demand is 
compensated by the flattening of the no-shirking condition (i.e. lower increase in wage is 
needed to give the “right” incentives to work). Employment does not change while the 
payroll tax is transferred on consumers.  
 
4) Union bargaining models  
 
Bargaining models (right-to-manage model or monopoly union model) emphasise the role 
of trade unions and collective bargaining in wage setting and in the determination of 
employment49. In these types of models unions are utilitarian (they care only about the 
welfare of their members) and small enough not to take into account the macro-economic 
consequences of their wage claims. Following a 'right to manage' model, unions and firms 
bargain over the wage level, taking into account the labour demand curve. Firms continue 
to choose the number of employees they wish once wages have been determined in the 
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The left hand side is the union’s proportional marginal benefit to the bargain from a 
proportional increase in the wage. The first expression in the right hand side is the 
percentage reduction in employment due to the proportional wage increase (the union’s 
marginal cost equals the elasticity of the labour demand) weighted by union power β . The 
second represents the firm’s proportional marginal cost (labour costs over total profits) 
weighted by firm’s power 1-β . In equilibrium marginal benefits equal marginal costs. 
Increased progression raises the union’s loss by pay rise in terms of the after-tax wage bill. 
It also raises the share of firms’ labour cost over total profits. Hence, the marginal costs rise 
when the tax system becomes more progressive and there is an incentive for both parties 
to limit the wage struck in the bargain. This implies wage moderation and lower 
unemployment rate.   
 
An increase in the payroll tax raises firm’s marginal costs and employment falls. However, 
the higher payroll tax is not entirely shifted onto firms. This can be seen by comparing the 
solution of the right-to-manage model with that of the monopoly union model. The 
monopoly union coincides with the right-to-manage model when firm’s bargaining power 
is zero (β =1). In this case, the union sets the wage, and the marginal costs of bargaining do 
not incorporate a firm’s marginal costs. An increase in the payroll tax leaves unchanged 
                                                 
49 See Booth (1995).  
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union’s marginal benefits, implying that firms carry the burden of taxation50. With β  
different from zero, the burden of the payroll tax is shared between employers and 
employees proportionally to their relative bargaining power.  
 


















B V  with 


































































In this context, wage setting ultimately depends on the tax wedge the unemployment rate 
u and labour productivity 
l
l f ) ( . If the utility is linear in wages (risk neutral in this case, 






































The wage formation mechanism is not independent from the rules setting the 
unemployment benefits. When unemployment benefits are indexed to the after-tax wage 
(fixed replacement rate), the producer and consumer wage can be obtained from the 
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1  is the index of tax progression. In this case, an increase in the replacement 
rate ρ  or a less progressive tax system (lower S), raises labour costs (w(1+τ )). It can be 
shown that the relationship between the consumer wage (w(1-tA)) and the unemployment 
                                                 
50 For the monopoly union case see van der Ploeg (2003).  
51 For β =1, this expression coincides with the case of a utilitarian monopoly union. When the reservation wage is fixed 
and taxation is proportional to labour income, tax changes are completely born by the employer and there is a complete 
after-tax wage resistance (Holmlund et al. (1989)). This outcome is independent on whether or not labour supply (in 
terms of hours worked) is exogenous or endogenous (Kilponen and Sinko (2003)).  
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rate is always downward sloping. Therefore, an increase in the payroll tax shifts the labour 
demand downward along a positively sloped wage setting curve. When unemployment 
benefits are indexed to the after-tax wage, an increase in the payroll tax leads to a higher 
unemployment rate and lower after tax wage. This finding generalises the monopoly 
union case (e.g. Van der Ploeg (2003)), where an increase in the payroll tax is entirely 
transferred on consumers in the form of lower after-tax wage, the wage setting curve is 






It is worthwhile stressing that both perfect and imperfect competition models predict a 
negative impact of average labour taxation on employment, through an (at least partial) 
increase in labour cost and/or a decrease in net take-home wage. What differs is the 
mechanism driving the response. In competitive models it is the value of the labour 
supply elasticity which determines the shift of wages on labour costs. In imperfect 
competition models, the shift of labour taxes depends on the slope of the no-shirking or 
the real wage bargaining curve. Besides, coordinated national bargaining is closer to 
competitive markets (with inelastic labour supply) when unions internalise the effects on 
employment of their wage claims. 
 
A2- Econometric methodology 
 
To differentiate between the short- and the long-term effect of taxes and social 
security contributions on wages we need to use a dynamic specification. This form 
allows to model the short-run adjustment process and to determine the implied 
long-run wage elasticity when the short-run dynamics has completely been solved 
out. We consider the following dynamic fixed effect model 
 
Wage setting curve 
Labour demand















Right to manage: indexed unemployment benefits
u 
after-tax wage  after-tax wage 
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it t i t i t i
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η α ε
ε β α , 1 , , ) (
 (1) 
 
α i and η t representing respectively unobserved country and time specific effect. The 
latter can be interpreted as capturing common aggregate shocks to real wages 
treated as time specific parameters. The individual and time specific effects are 
uncorrelated between each other and well-behaved:  
2,...T  t and 1,...N  i for      0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = = = = = t i t i E E E η α η α . xit is a vector of explanatory variables 
some of which are jointly determined with the wages (and consequently 
endogenous); other variables can be weakly exogenous or predetermined.  
 
The presence of a lagged dependent variable in the model introduces a correlation 
between the right hand regressors:  
 
0 )) ) ( ( ( ) ( 1 1 1 , 2 , 1 , ≠ + + + + = − − − − − it t i t i t i i t i i u x L y E y E η α β α α α  (2) 
 
Hence, the traditional OLS estimator, or some more general non-spherical variant 
(GLS or Within), is biased and inconsistent. This happens because there are two 
sources of persistence - over individuals, due to the presence of the time invariant 
fixed effects, and over time due to the autocorrelated structure of the model – while 
the standard OLS/GLS type of estimator does not exploit all the available 
information, namely the moment conditions. When there are no exogenous 
variables, Nickell showed that the LSDV estimator of α  is biased but asymptotically 
correct. The first difference wipes out the individual effect, but the OLS estimator is 
still inconsistent as  
  
0 ) ) ) ( ( ) )( (( , 1 1 1 , 2 , , 1 , ≠ ∆ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ∆ − − − − − t i it t t i t i t i t i u u x L y E u y E η β α  (3) 
Judson and Owen (1999) showed that in macro panel with a large time dimension 
the bias of the fixed effect estimator can be sizeable and increases with the 
persistency of the dependent variable and decreases with T. Judson and Owen 
recommend the corrected FE estimator proposed by Kiviet (1995) and as second best 
the GMM-dif and the computationally simple Anderson and Hsiao. 
 
Anderson and Hsiao proposed to remove the individual fixed effect taking the first 
difference and then using as instruments yt-2 or (yt-2-yt-3)  since 
0 ) ) ( ) )( (( , 2 , , 2 , = ∆ ∆ = ∆ − − t i t i t i t i u y E u y E 52. The AH-IV estimator is consistent but not 
necessarily the most efficient, as it does not exploit additional linear moment 
restrictions. Moreover, it assumes that the explanatory variables are strictly 
exogenous (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term at all leads and lags).  
 
The GMM estimator allows for individual specific heterogeneity and endogeneity 
of explanatory variables. It is efficient and consistent in the class of IV procedures 
because it exploits all linear moment restrictions derived from the assumption of 
                                                 
52 However, the IV estimator based on lagged difference is less efficient than the IV based on the lagged level of the 
dependent variable (Arellano (1989)).   
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orthogonality between the transformed disturbances and lagged levels of the 
dependent variable. In GMM the number of instruments grows over subsequent 
cross-sections as the time dimension of the panel expands. Additionally explanatory 
variables can or not be correlated with the individual effects and also exogenous, 
predetermined or endogenous. For each of these, the GMM estimator exploits 
further moment restrictions.  
 
In small samples the GMM differenced estimator (Dif-GMM) is biased and 
inefficient when lagged variables are weakly correlated with first differences (i.e. the 
instruments are weak)53. The system-GMM (Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998)) estimates systems of equation in levels and first differences with 
instruments respectively first differences and lagged levels.  
 
1.  First differenced GMM estimator 
 
Consider the following dynamic fixed effect model 
 
1               1 , , < + + = − α α α it i t i t i u y y  (4) 
 
with  s t u u E u E u E E it is i it it i ≠ = = = = for    0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( α α . The model in first differences wipes out 
the individual effects, but the lagged dependent variables in first differences is 
correlated with the first difference is the error term. If we take the first difference 
then the first cross-section observed is for t=3:  2 3 2 , 3 , i i i i u u y y − + ∆ = ∆ α . y1  is a valid 
instrument as it is correlated with ∆ y2 but not with ∆ u3. Equally, for t=4, the second 
cross-section is  3 4 3 , 4 , i i i i u u y y − + ∆ = ∆ α  and both y1 and y2 are instruments for ∆ y3. Since 
both are uncorrelated with ∆ u4. In this case lagged levels dated t-2 and earlier are 
valid instruments. Hence, the general moment conditions can be written as follows  
 
0 ) (   form matrix    in or    2 s   and   T 3,...., for t   0 ) ( , = ≥ = = ∆ − i i ∆u Z' E u y E it s t i  (5) 
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53 In this case the instruments used in the GMM contain little information about the endogenous lagged dependent 
variable in first differences. In this sense the instruments are weak. Weak instruments also occur when the ratio between 
the variance of the unobserved individual effects αit is relatively larger than the variance of uit. See Alonso-Borrego and 
Arellano 1996).  
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With the initial conditions  ,..,T  t ,..,n  i u y E it i 2 and   1 for   0 ) ( 1 , = = =  they impose 
2
) 2 )( 1 ( − − T T  
moment restrictions. 
 
When explanatory variables correlated with the individual specific effects are α i 
included, the instruments available depend on the explanatory variables being 
strictly exogenous, predetermined or endogenous. Consider the following model 
with additional explanatory variables.  
 
1       , 1 , , < + + + = − α α β α it i t i t i t i u x y y  (6) 
 
If the xit are strictly exogenous  uncorrelated with past present and future 
disturbances (i.e. E(xitvis)=0 for all t and s) but correlated with the individual effects 
(i.e. E(xitα i)≠  0), then xit for t=1,2,…T are valid instruments for the equation in the 
first difference and each row of Zi includes  ] ' . . .. ' ' [ 2 1 iT i i x x x  after yi1.  In addition to 
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When the explanatory variables are predetermined,  or weakly exogenous, 
contemporaneous correlation with the shocks is excluded but feedbacks from 
previous shocks are possible. In symbols E(xituis) ≠ 0 for s<t and zero otherwise. They 
are also correlated with the individual effects (i.e. E(xitα i)≠  0). The moment 
conditions are  
 
1 - t s 1   and   T 3,..., for t   0 ) ( , ≤ ≤ = = ∆ − it s t i u x E  (7) 
In this case,  ] ' . . .. ' ' [ 1 2 1 − is i i x x x  are valid instruments in the differenced equation for 
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With  endogenous explanatory variables, the contemporaneous correlation with 
current shocks is non zero and feedbacks from past shocks on current x are possible: 
E(xitvis) ≠ 0 for s≤ t and zero otherwise. The moment conditions are  
 
1 s 2   and   T 3,..., for t   0 ) ( , − ≤ ≤ = = ∆ − t u x E it s t i  (8) 
and Zi is   
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In all cases pre-multiplying the model by Zi and using the GLS estimator one gets 
the one-step Arellano and Bond consistent estimator54.  
 
2.  System Estimator  
 
Lagged levels are weak instruments for the regression equation in first differences 
when individual series are either highly persistent (i.e. when their DGP is almost 
I(1)) or when the variance of the individual specific effects α i increases relative to the 
variance of the transitory shock ε it (Blundell and Bond (1998)). When the instruments 
are weak the estimate of α  is biased downward in small samples and the estimates 
of the coefficient imprecise55.  
 
To detect whether the instruments are weak Bond, Hoefler and Temple (2001) 
suggest comparing first difference GMM estimates with the OLS and the Within 
Group estimators. In AR(1) models the OLS estimate of α  is biased upwards while 
Within Group is biased downward56. If the GMM differenced estimator is similar to 
the Within Group then this should be an indication of weak instrument and it would 
be more appropriate to estimate with the system-GMM. When explanatory variables 
other than the lagged dependent variable appear in the equation, the same result 
holds when these variables are uncorrelated with the individual specific effects α i.  
The system estimator combines the regression in differences with the regression in 
levels. For the regression in differences the instruments are as in the Dif-GMM 
estimator. For the regression in levels the instruments are the lagged differences of 
the corresponding variables.  
 
When the model AR(1) is mean stationary, so that the mean differs across 
individuals but is constant over time, the lagged differences are valid instruments 
for the equations in levels57. In symbols, the following T-2 moments condition are 
considered in addition to the moment conditions given in (5)  
 
  T 3,..., for t   0 ) ( 1 , = = ∆ − it t i y u E  (9) 
                                                 
54 For a clear description of GMM see Baltagi (2000) 
55 The asymptotic variance of the coefficients obtained with the difference estimator rises with the persistency. 
56 See for example R. Blundell, S. Bond, F. Windmeijer  (2000), Estimation in Dynamic Panel Data Models: Improving 
on the performance of the Standard GMM Estimator, IFS WP no. 12. 
57 Given that the lagged levels are used as instruments in the specification in differences, only the most recent difference 
is used in the equation in levels. Using other lagged differences would result in redundant moment conditions.  
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Condition 9 requires that  1 − ∆ it y is uncorrelated with η i. The validity of this additional 
restriction can be tested comparing the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions of 
the GMM system estimator with the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions of 
the GMM difference estimator. The difference between the two Sargan test 
(Difference Sargan statistics) is distributed as a Chi-squared with ms-md degrees of 
freedom. Where ms and md are the number of moments conditions in the system and 
difference GMM estimators. 
A3 - Data sources and definitions  
 
In this study annual data (for the period 1980-2000) from the OECD Taxing Wages 
publication are used to construct the tax wedge (overall and its components: income 
tax, employers’ social security contributions and  employees’ social security 
contributions). The components of the tax wedge are calculated by the OECD on the 
basis of a micro-simulation of national tax legislation. As a proxy of the tax burden 
on labour for a representative agent we use the tax wedge for a single production 
worker in the manufacturing sector, at the average wage level (that is, 100% of the 
Average Production Worker (APW) wage level). The tax wedge is defined as non-
wage component of labour costs over total labour costs. It corresponds to the 
difference between the after-tax and the before-tax labour costs as a percentage of 











To check the robustness of our findings to different measures of the tax burden, 
econometric estimates are reiterated by using implicit tax rates as calculated by DG 
ECFIN (see EC Economic Paper n. 146/2000 by C. Martinez-Mongay ). These are so-
called “backward looking” indicators, based on Mendoza-Razin-Tesar method, 
using aggregate figures from National Accounts and actual average tax revenues.  
While macroeconomic measures of tax indicators are generally easy to construct 
(and certainly easier than “forward looking” indicators based on the simulation of 
current rules), they suffer from the disadvantage that it is very hard to control for 
compositional change and endogenous effects. These two effects can generate a 
change in the overall size of the indicators even if the tax rules (which are the 
relevant policy variables) have not changed. 
  
  - 52 -
The remaining variables are all from the AMECO data base. Our dependent variable 
RLCOMPCM is the nominal compensation per employee for the total economy 
deflated with the price deflator of final consumption expenditure. The productivity 
measure (LPRODMe) corresponds to the GDP at 1995 market price per person 
employed. The price wedge (LREALCM) is calculated as the ratio between the 
deflator of private final consumption expenditure and the GDP deflator. The 
unemployment rate (u) is the harmonised unemployment rate. All variable but u are 
in logs. The tax wedge and its components used in the econometric analysis are 
defined as log(l+x) where x is the tax wedge or one of its components. 
 
A4 - Centralisation of Bargaining 
 
In the empirical analysis we test the role of centralisation running the same equation 
using information from three different sources. The first is based on the data set 
assembled by Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (henceforth GLW), the second on the 
taxonomy of Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) (henceforth EMS), the third on 
the labour market institutions data base by Nickell and Nunziata (2001) (henceforth 
NN).  
 
In the GLW dataset, the bargaining level at which wages is determined is coded into 
5 groups:  
 
1 plant-level wage setting  
2 industry-level wage setting without sanctions 
3 industry level wage settings with sanctions 
4 sectoral wage setting without sanctions  
5 sectoral level wage settings with sanctions 
 
To keep degree of freedom, the 5 groups have been reduced to three aggregating 
codes 2-3 and 4-5.  Then we have created three dummy variables that map countries 
into the three categories low, medium and high. The EMS classification is a 
summary measure of centralisation/co-ordination and gives a prominent role to co-
ordination in the case of sectoral wage bargaining. Finally, the bargaining coordination 
1  index by Nickell and Nunziata is an index with a range {1,3} constructed as 
interpolation of OECD data on bargaining coordination and it is increasing in the 
degree of coordination. Thus, GLW dataset provides information on the level of 
wage setting while EMS and NN gives more weight to co-ordination as a 
mechanism to increase consensus between collective bargaining. The GWL dataset 
contains information on all Member States except Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Portugal while in the NN the information for Greece and Luxembourg is not 
available. 
 
The three indexes convey the same information. The level of centralisation of wage 
setting refers only to the level at which bargaining takes place (firm, industry or 
economy-wide), while co-ordination occurs when the effects of wage setting on 
employment are taken into account. Hence, co-ordination may also be possible with  
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intermediate levels of centralisation in the presence of inter-industry co-ordination 




Bargaining level  
Goldberg, Lange, Wallerstein 
(2002) 
Summary measure of 
centralisation/co-ordination 









Italy until 1991, UK from 1987 
 
 
Italy until 1992; UK4; 
France until 19892; 
Portugal until 19892;  
Intermediate 
Belgium 1979-1980 and 1987-
1993; France 1979-2000; 
Finland 1980, 1983, 1988-
1989,1994-1995, 2000; Sweden 
1984, 1988, 1995-1997; 
Denmark 1981, Germany, 
Spain 1984, 1987-2000 Italy 
1992-2000, Netherlands 1979, 
1985-1989, 1991-1992, 1996-
2000; Austria 1979-2000;  
Belgium; France; Portugal; Finland 
since 1985; Sweden since 1991; 
Spain since 1996; Netherlands 







Belgium; France from 
1990; Portugal from 1990; 
Finland; Denmark1; 
Sweden3; Spain; 
Netherlands; Ireland until 
1987; Italy since 1992; 
 
High 
Belgium 1981-1986, 1994-2000; 
Denmark 1979-1980; Denmark 
1982-2000; Spain 1979-1983; 
1985-1986; Italy 1979-1991; 
Netherlands 1980-1984, 1990, 
1993-1995; Finland 1979, 1981-
1982; 1984-1987; 1990-1993; 
1996-1999; Sweden 1979-1983, 
1985-1987; 1989-1994, 1998-
2000; UK 1979 
Denmark, Germany; Austria;  
Netherlands since 1982; Ireland 
since 1988; Italy since 1992; 
Finland until 1984, Spain until 






Germany, Austria, Ireland 
since 1988 
1 Gradually decreasing from 1980 to 1990 
2 Gradually increasing but below 2;  
3 Gradually decreasing but above 2; 
4 Gradually decreasing; 
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LIST OF VARIABLES 
RLCOMPCM: real labour costs (rlc) 
LPRODM: labour productivity (π ) 
LREALCM: price wedge (tc) 
LWEDGEM: log(1+tax wedge) 
LWEDGEMN: LWEDGEM when wedge is decreasing  







SSCM: social security contributions as % of gross wage 
LPERSTAXM: (income tax + employees’ social security contributions) as % of gross wage 








Table A1  Short-run wage equation: non-linear effects of tax wedge 
(Balanced panel 1979-2000) 
 OLS  Within  Dif-GMM  Sys-GMM 
RLCOMPCM(-1)  0.98*** 0.93***  0.93***  0.93*** 
LPRODMe  0.50*** 0.49***  0.50***  0.48*** 
LPRODMe(-1)  -0.48*** -0.41***  -0.41***  -0.42*** 
LREALCM  -0.85*** -0.81***  -0.80***  -0.87*** 
LREALCM(-1)  0.59*** 0.56***  0.55***  0.53*** 
LREALCM(-2)  0.32*** 0.32***  0.35***  0.38*** 
LWEDGEMP  -0.003 0.16** 0.24***  0.11** 
LWEDGEMN  0.020 0.19**  0.28***  0.13** 
U(-1)  -0.0005* -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002*** 
        










χ 2(2)= 2.31 
[0.13] 
χ 2(2)= 0.92 
[0.33] 
Ar(1): m1-test  0.05 0.09 0.013  0.007 
Ar(2):m2-test  0.89 0.55  0.23  0.21 
Ar(3):m2-test  0.42 0.31  0.25  0.24 
Obs.  300 300  300  300 
m1 and m2 are tests of first- and second- order serial autocorrelation 
asymptotically N(0,1); p-values reported. Note that in the case of the GMM-dif 
estimator the difference transformation generates MA(1) errors and, thus, with first 
order autocorrelation. However, the disturbances in the difference equation are 2nd 
order uncorrelated when the disturbances in the level equation are 1st order 
uncorrelated. m2 tests for second order autocorrelation in the first-difference 
residuals.  
* Significant at 10% level; * * significant at 5% level; * * * significant at 1% level.  
In dif-GMM instruments are RLCOMPCMt-2, LWEDGEMPt-2, LWEDGEMNt-2 
and all further lags. In Sys-GMM additional instruments for level equations are 









Short-run wage equation: endogenous explanatory 
variables – alternative measures of tax wedge and implicit 
tax rate on consumption 
(Balanced panel 1979-2000) 
  OLS Within  Dif-GMM  Sys-GMM 
RLCOMPCM(-1)  0.98*** 0.90*** 0.87***  0.94*** 
LPRODMe  0.50*** 0.53*** 0.53***  0.51*** 
LPRODMe(-1)  -0.49*** -0.39*** -0.39***  -0.45*** 
LCITRM  -0.09** -0.08**  -0.084**  -0.098* 
LCITRM (-1)  0.07* 0.060* 0.06*  0.06 
LCITRM (-2)  0.015 0.006  0.0042  0.012 
LLITRM  0.12*** 0.14** 0.14***  0.11* 
LLITRM (-1)  -0.13*** -0.10** -0.10***  -0.11** 
U  -0.001** -0.003**  -0.003***  -0.001** 
       
Sargan Test   : :  χ 2(659)=38
6.5 
χ 2(724)=386.8 
Ar(1): m1-test  0.06 0.08  0.009  0.063 
Ar(2):m2-test  0.39 0.41 0.14  0.12 
Ar(3):m3-test  0.10 0.12 0.09  0.07 
Obs.  300 300 285  300 
Specification tests as above. * Significant at 10% level; * * significant at 5% level; 
* * *  significant at 1% level. Implicit tax rates calculated by Martinez-Mongay 








Implied long-run wage equation: alternative 
measures of tax wedge and implicit tax rate on 
consumption 
 OLS  Within  Dif-GMM  Sys-GMM 
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